Filsafat kecerdasan buatan: Perbedaan antara revisi

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Revisi terkini sejak 21 Juli 2023 17.17

Filsafat kecerdasan buatan berupaya menjawab pertanyaan seperti:^[1]

Dapatkah mesin bertindak secara cerdas? Dapatkah mesin menyelesaikan semua masalah yang akan diselesaikan seseorang dengan cara berpikir?
Apakah mesin memiliki budi dan kesadaran seperti manusia? Dapatkan mereka merasakan?
Apakah kecerdasan manusia dan mesin itu sama? Apakah otak manusia pada dasarnya merupakan sebuah komputer?

Tiga pertanyaan tersebut melambangkan ketertarikan peneliti, filsuf, dan ilmuwan kognitif kecerdasan buatan. Jawaban terhadap pertanyaan-pertanyaan tersebut bergantung pada bagaimana seseorang mendefinisikan "kecerdasan" atau "kesadaran" dan "mesin" mana yang sedang diperbincangkan.

Dalil-dalil penting dalam kecerdasan buatan adalah:

"Konvensi sopan" Turing: Apabila mesin bertindak secerdas manusia, maka mesin sama cerdasnya dengan manusia.^[2]
Usulan Dartmouth: "Setiap aspek pembelajaran atau ciri lain kecerdasan dapat digambarkan secara tepat sehingga sebuah mesin dapat diciptakan untuk merangsangnya."^[3]
Hipotesis sistem lambang fisik Newell dan Simon: "Sistem lambang fisik mempunyai arti tindakan kecerdasan umum yang penting dan mencukupi."^[4]
Hipotesis kecerdasan buatan kuat Searle: "Komputer yang diprogram dengan tepat dengan input dan output yang benar punya budi seperti manusia."^[5]
Mekanisme Hobbes: "Nalar tidak lain adalah perhitungan."^[6]

Catatan kaki

^ Russell & Norvig 2003, hlm. 947 define the philosophy of AI as consisting of the first two questions, and the additional question of the ethics of artificial intelligence. Fearn 2007, hlm. 55 writes "In the current literature, philosophy has to chief roles: to determine whether or not such machines would be conscious, and, second, to predict whether or not such machines are possible." The last question bears on the first two.
^ This is a paraphrase of the essential point of the Turing Test. Turing 1950, Haugeland 1985, hlm. 6–9, Crevier 1993, hlm. 24, Russell & Norvig 2003, hlm. 2–3 and 948
^ McCarthy et al. 1955. This assertion was printed in the program for the Dartmouth Conference of 1956, widely considered the "birth of AI."also Crevier 1993, hlm. 28
^ Newell & Simon 1976 and Russell & Norvig 2003, hlm. 18
^ This version is from (Searle 1999), and is also quoted in Dennett 1991, hlm. 435. Searle's original formulation was "The appropriately programmed computer really is a mind, in the sense that computers given the right programs can be literally said to understand and have other cognitive states." (Searle 1980, hlm. 1). Strong AI is defined similarly by (Russell & Norvig 2003, hlm. 947): "The assertion that machines could possibly act intelligently (or, perhaps better, act as if they were intelligent) is called the 'weak AI' hypothesis by philosophers, and the assertion that machines that do so are actually thinking (as opposed to simulating thinking) is called the 'strong AI' hypothesis."
^ Hobbes 1651, chpt. 5

Referensi

Blackmore, Susan (2005), Consciousness: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford University Press
Brooks, Rodney (1990), "Elephants Don't Play Chess" (PDF), Robotics and Autonomous Systems, 6: 3–15, doi:10.1016/S0921-8890(05)80025-9, diarsipkan (PDF) dari versi asli tanggal 2007-08-09, diakses tanggal 2007-08-30
Chalmers, David J (1996), The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory, Oxford University Press, New York, ISBN 0-19-511789-1 (Pbk.) Periksa nilai: invalid character |isbn= (bantuan)
Cole, David (Fall 2004), "The Chinese Room Argument", dalam Zalta, Edward N., The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, diarsipkan dari versi asli tanggal 2021-02-27, diakses tanggal 2011-02-09 .
Dennett, Daniel (1991), Consciousness Explained, The Penguin Press, ISBN 0-7139-9037-6
Dreyfus, Hubert (1972), What Computers Can't Do, New York: MIT Press, ISBN 0060110821
Dreyfus, Hubert (1979), What Computers Still Can't Do, New York: MIT Press .
Dreyfus, Hubert; Dreyfus, Stuart (1986), Mind over Machine: The Power of Human Intuition and Expertise in the Era of the Computer, Oxford, UK: Blackwell
Fearn, Nicholas (2007), The Latest Answers to the Oldest Questions: A Philosophical Adventure with the World's Greatest Thinkers, New York: Grove Press
Gladwell, Malcolm (2005), Blink: The Power of Thinking Without Thinking, Boston: Little, Brown, ISBN 0-316-17232-4 .
Harnad, Stevan (2001), "What's Wrong and Right About Searle's Chinese Room Argument?", dalam Bishop, M.; Preston, J., Essays on Searle's Chinese Room Argument, Oxford University Press, diarsipkan dari versi asli tanggal 2011-10-26, diakses tanggal 2011-02-09
Hobbes (1651), Leviathan .
Hofstadter, Douglas (1979), Gödel, Escher, Bach: an Eternal Golden Braid .
Horst, Steven (Fall 2005), "The Computational Theory of Mind", dalam Zalta, Edward N., The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, diarsipkan dari versi asli tanggal 2021-03-04, diakses tanggal 2011-02-09 .
Kurzweil, Ray (2005), The Singularity is Near, New York: Viking Press, ISBN 0-670-03384-7 .
Lucas, John (1961), "Minds, Machines and Gödel", dalam Anderson, A.R., Minds and Machines, diarsipkan dari versi asli tanggal 2007-08-19, diakses tanggal 2011-02-09 .
McCarthy, John; Minsky, Marvin; Rochester, Nathan; Shannon, Claude (1955), A Proposal for the Dartmouth Summer Research Project on Artificial Intelligence, diarsipkan dari versi asli tanggal 2007-08-26, diakses tanggal 2011-02-09 .
McDermott, Drew (May 14, 1997), "How Intelligent is Deep Blue", New York Times, diarsipkan dari versi asli tanggal 2007-10-04, diakses tanggal 2011-02-09
Moravec, Hans (1988), Mind Children, Harvard University Press
Newell, Allen; Simon, H. A. (1963), "GPS: A Program that Simulates Human Thought", dalam Feigenbaum, E.A.; Feldman, J., Computers and Thought, McGraw-Hill
Newell, Allen; Simon, H. A. (1976), "Computer Science as Empirical Inquiry: Symbols and Search", Communications of the ACM, 19 (3), diarsipkan dari versi asli tanggal 2008-10-07, diakses tanggal 2011-02-09
Templat:Russell Norvig 2003
Penrose, Roger (1989), The Emperor's New Mind: Concerning Computers, Minds, and The Laws of Physics, Oxford University Press, ISBN 0-14-014534-6
Searle, John (1980), "Minds, Brains and Programs", Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (3): 417–457, doi:10.1017/S0140525X00005756, diarsipkan dari versi asli tanggal 2000-08-23, diakses tanggal 2011-02-09
Searle, John (1992), The Rediscovery of the Mind, Cambridge, Massachusetts: M.I.T. Press
Searle, John (1999), Mind, language and society, New York, NY: Basic Books, ISBN 0465045219, OCLC 231867665 43689264 Periksa nilai |oclc= (bantuan)

Artikel bertopik filsafat ini adalah sebuah rintisan. Anda dapat membantu Wikipedia dengan mengembangkannya.

[1] Russell & Norvig 2003, hlm. 947 define the philosophy of AI as consisting of the first two questions, and the additional question of the ethics of artificial intelligence. Fearn 2007, hlm. 55 writes "In the current literature, philosophy has to chief roles: to determine whether or not such machines would be conscious, and, second, to predict whether or not such machines are possible." The last question bears on the first two.

[T-2] This is a paraphrase of the essential point of the Turing Test. Turing 1950, Haugeland 1985, hlm. 6–9, Crevier 1993, hlm. 24, Russell & Norvig 2003, hlm. 2–3 and 948

[MMRS-3] McCarthy et al. 1955. This assertion was printed in the program for the Dartmouth Conference of 1956, widely considered the "birth of AI."also Crevier 1993, hlm. 28

[NS-4] Newell & Simon 1976 and Russell & Norvig 2003, hlm. 18

[SWAI-5] This version is from (Searle 1999), and is also quoted in Dennett 1991, hlm. 435. Searle's original formulation was "The appropriately programmed computer really is a mind, in the sense that computers given the right programs can be literally said to understand and have other cognitive states." (Searle 1980, hlm. 1). Strong AI is defined similarly by (Russell & Norvig 2003, hlm. 947): "The assertion that machines could possibly act intelligently (or, perhaps better, act as if they were intelligent) is called the 'weak AI' hypothesis by philosophers, and the assertion that machines that do so are actually thinking (as opposed to simulating thinking) is called the 'strong AI' hypothesis."

[H-6] Hobbes 1651, chpt. 5

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[6]

@@ Baris 1: / Baris 1: @@
 '''Filsafat [[kecerdasan buatan]]''' berupaya menjawab pertanyaan seperti:<ref>{{Harvnb|Russell|Norvig|2003|p=947}} define the philosophy of AI as consisting of the first two questions, and the additional question of the [[ethics of artificial intelligence]]. {{Harvnb|Fearn|2007|p=55}} writes "In the current literature, philosophy has to chief roles: to determine whether or not such machines would be conscious, and, second, to predict whether or not such machines are possible." The last question bears on the first two.</ref>
 * Dapatkah mesin bertindak secara cerdas? Dapatkah mesin menyelesaikan semua masalah yang akan diselesaikan seseorang dengan cara berpikir?
-* Apakah mesin punya [[filsafat pikiran|pikiran]] dan kesadaran seperti manusia? Dapatkan mereka ''merasakan''?
+* Apakah mesin memiliki [[filsafat budi|budi]] dan kesadaran seperti manusia? Dapatkan mereka ''merasakan''?
 * Apakah kecerdasan manusia dan mesin itu sama? Apakah otak manusia pada dasarnya merupakan sebuah komputer?
 Tiga pertanyaan tersebut melambangkan ketertarikan peneliti, filsuf, dan ilmuwan kognitif kecerdasan buatan. Jawaban terhadap pertanyaan-pertanyaan tersebut bergantung pada bagaimana seseorang mendefinisikan "kecerdasan" atau "kesadaran" dan "mesin" mana yang sedang diperbincangkan.
 Dalil-dalil penting dalam kecerdasan buatan adalah:
-*[[Percobaan Turing|"Konvensi sopan" Turing]]: ''Apabila mesin bertindak secerdas manusia, maka mesin sama cerdasnya dengan manusia.''<ref name=T>This is a paraphrase of the essential point of the [[Turing Test]]. {{Harvnb|Turing|1950}}, {{Harvnb|Haugeland|1985|pp=6–9}}, {{Harvnb|Crevier|1993|p=24}}, {{Harvnb|Russell|Norvig|2003|pp=2–3 and 948}}</ref>
+* [[Percobaan Turing|"Konvensi sopan" Turing]]: ''Apabila mesin bertindak secerdas manusia, maka mesin sama cerdasnya dengan manusia.''<ref name=T>This is a paraphrase of the essential point of the [[Turing Test]]. {{Harvnb|Turing|1950}}, {{Harvnb|Haugeland|1985|pp=6–9}}, {{Harvnb|Crevier|1993|p=24}}, {{Harvnb|Russell|Norvig|2003|pp=2–3 and 948}}</ref>
 * [[Konferensi Dartmouth|Usulan Dartmouth]]: ''"Setiap aspek pembelajaran atau ciri lain kecerdasan dapat digambarkan secara tepat sehingga sebuah mesin dapat diciptakan untuk merangsangnya."''<ref name=MMRS>{{Harvnb|McCarthy|Minsky|Rochester|Shannon|1955}}. This assertion was printed in the program for the [[Dartmouth Conferences|Dartmouth Conference]] of 1956, widely considered the "birth of AI."also {{Harvnb|Crevier|1993|p=28}}</ref>
 * Hipotesis [[sistem lambang fisik]] [[Alan Newell|Newell]] dan [[Herbert Simon|Simon]]: ''"Sistem lambang fisik mempunyai arti tindakan kecerdasan umum yang penting dan mencukupi."''<ref name=NS>{{Harvnb|Newell|Simon|1976}} and {{Harvnb|Russell|Norvig|2003|p=18}}</ref>
-* [[Hipotesis kecerdasan buatan kuat]] [[John Searle|Searle]]: ''"Komputer yang diprogram dengan tepat dengan input dan output yang benar punya pikiran seperti manusia."''<ref name=SWAI>This version is from {{Harvtxt|Searle|1999}}, and is also quoted in {{Harvnb|Dennett|1991|p=435}}.  Searle's original formulation was "The appropriately programmed computer really is a mind, in the sense that computers given the right programs can be literally said to understand and have other cognitive states."  {{Harv|Searle|1980|p=1}}.  Strong AI is defined similarly by {{Harvtxt|Russell|Norvig|2003|p=947}}: "The assertion that machines could possibly act intelligently (or, perhaps better, act as if they were intelligent) is called the 'weak AI' hypothesis by philosophers, and the assertion that machines that do so are actually thinking (as opposed to simulating thinking) is called the 'strong AI' hypothesis."</ref>
+* [[Hipotesis kecerdasan buatan kuat]] [[John Searle|Searle]]: ''"Komputer yang diprogram dengan tepat dengan input dan output yang benar punya budi seperti manusia."''<ref name=SWAI>This version is from {{Harvtxt|Searle|1999}}, and is also quoted in {{Harvnb|Dennett|1991|p=435}}. Searle's original formulation was "The appropriately programmed computer really is a mind, in the sense that computers given the right programs can be literally said to understand and have other cognitive states." {{Harv|Searle|1980|p=1}}. Strong AI is defined similarly by {{Harvtxt|Russell|Norvig|2003|p=947}}: "The assertion that machines could possibly act intelligently (or, perhaps better, act as if they were intelligent) is called the 'weak AI' hypothesis by philosophers, and the assertion that machines that do so are actually thinking (as opposed to simulating thinking) is called the 'strong AI' hypothesis."</ref>
-* Mekanisme [[Hobbes]]: ''"Alasan tidak lain adalah perhitungan."''<ref name=H>{{Harvnb|Hobbes|1651|loc=chpt. 5}}</ref>
+* Mekanisme [[Hobbes]]: ''"Nalar tidak lain adalah perhitungan."''<ref name=H>{{Harvnb|Hobbes|1651|loc=chpt. 5}}</ref>
 == Catatan kaki ==
@@ Baris 16: / Baris 16: @@
 == Referensi ==
-==References==
 * {{Citation | last=Blackmore | first=Susan | year=2005| title=Consciousness: A Very Short Introduction | publisher=Oxford University Press |author-link=Susan Blackmore }}
-* {{Citation | last=Brooks | first=Rodney | author-link=Rodney Brooks | year =1990 | title = Elephants Don't Play Chess | journal = Robotics and Autonomous Systems | volume=6 | pages=3–15  | url=http://people.csail.mit.edu/brooks/papers/elephants.pdf |format=PDF| accessdate=2007-08-30 | doi=10.1016/S0921-8890(05)80025-9}}
+* {{Citation | last=Brooks | first=Rodney | author-link=Rodney Brooks | year=1990 | title=Elephants Don't Play Chess | journal=Robotics and Autonomous Systems | volume=6 | pages=3–15 | url=http://people.csail.mit.edu/brooks/papers/elephants.pdf | format=PDF | accessdate=2007-08-30 | doi=10.1016/S0921-8890(05)80025-9 | archive-date=2007-08-09 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070809020912/http://people.csail.mit.edu/brooks/papers/elephants.pdf | dead-url=no }}
 * {{Citation | last=Chalmers | first=David J | author-link=David Chalmers | year=1996 | title=The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory| publisher=Oxford University Press, New York | isbn= 0-19-511789-1 (Pbk.)}}
-* {{Citation | last=Cole | first=David | contribution=The Chinese Room Argument | title=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy | date = Fall 2004 | editor-first=Edward N. | editor-last = Zalta | url=http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2004/entries/chinese-room/ }}.
+* {{Citation | last=Cole | first=David | contribution=The Chinese Room Argument | title=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy | date=Fall 2004 | editor-first=Edward N. | editor-last=Zalta | url=http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2004/entries/chinese-room/ | accessdate=2011-02-09 | archive-date=2021-02-27 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210227111707/http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2004/entries/chinese-room/ | dead-url=no }}.
 * {{Citation | last=Dennett | first=Daniel | author-link=Daniel Dennett | year=1991 | title=[[Consciousness Explained]] | publisher=The Penguin Press | isbn= 0-7139-9037-6}}
 * {{Citation | last=Dreyfus | first=Hubert | year =1972 | title = [[What Computers Can't Do]]  | publisher = MIT Press | location = New York | authorlink = Hubert Dreyfus | isbn = 0060110821 }}
@@ Baris 28: / Baris 26: @@
 * {{Citation | last=Fearn | first = Nicholas | year =2007 | title= The Latest Answers to the Oldest Questions: A Philosophical Adventure with the World's Greatest Thinkers | publisher = Grove Press | location=New York }}
 * {{Citation | last=Gladwell | first=Malcolm | title=[[Blink (book)|Blink: The Power of Thinking Without Thinking]]| location=Boston | publisher=Little, Brown | year=2005 | isbn= 0-316-17232-4 |authorlink= Malcolm Gladwell}}.
-* {{Citation | last=Harnad | first = Stevan | year=2001| contribution=What's Wrong and Right About Searle's Chinese Room Argument? | editor-first=M. | editor-last = Bishop | editor2-first = J. | editor2-last = Preston | title = Essays on Searle's Chinese Room Argument | publisher = Oxford University Press | url=http://cogprints.org/4023/1/searlbook.htm | author-link = Stevan Harnad }}
+* {{Citation | last = Harnad | first = Stevan | year = 2001 | contribution = What's Wrong and Right About Searle's Chinese Room Argument? | editor-first = M. | editor-last = Bishop | editor2-first = J. | editor2-last = Preston | title = Essays on Searle's Chinese Room Argument | publisher = Oxford University Press | url = http://cogprints.org/4023/1/searlbook.htm | author-link = Stevan Harnad | accessdate = 2011-02-09 | archive-date = 2011-10-26 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20111026215921/http://cogprints.org/4023/1/searlbook.htm | dead-url = no }}
 * {{Citation | last=Hobbes | title = [[Leviathan]] | year = 1651 |author-link=Hobbes}}.
 * {{Citation | last=Hofstadter | first = Douglas | title = [[Gödel, Escher, Bach|Gödel, Escher, Bach: an Eternal Golden Braid]] | year = 1979 | author-link = Douglas Hofstadter }}.
-* {{Citation | last=Horst | first= Steven | contribution =The Computational Theory of Mind | title= The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy | date = Fall 2005 | editor-first = Edward N. | editor-last = Zalta | url = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2005/entries/computational-mind/ }}.
+* {{Citation | last = Horst | first = Steven | contribution = The Computational Theory of Mind | title = The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy | date = Fall 2005 | editor-first = Edward N. | editor-last = Zalta | url = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2005/entries/computational-mind/ | accessdate = 2011-02-09 | archive-date = 2021-03-04 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20210304113123/https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2005/entries/computational-mind/ | dead-url = no }}.
 * {{Citation | last=Kurzweil | first = Ray | title = [[The Singularity is Near]] | year = 2005 | publisher = Viking Press | location = New York | authorlink = Ray Kurzweil | isbn=0-670-03384-7}}.
-* {{Citation | last=Lucas | first=John| year = 1961 | contribution=Minds, Machines and Gödel | editor-last =Anderson |editor-first =A.R. | title=Minds and Machines | url = http://users.ox.ac.uk/~jrlucas/Godel/mmg.html |author-link = John Lucas (philosopher)}}.
+* {{Citation | last=Lucas | first=John | year=1961 | contribution=Minds, Machines and Gödel | editor-last=Anderson | editor-first=A.R. | title=Minds and Machines | url=http://users.ox.ac.uk/~jrlucas/Godel/mmg.html | author-link=John Lucas (philosopher) | accessdate=2011-02-09 | archive-date=2007-08-19 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070819165214/http://users.ox.ac.uk/~jrlucas/Godel/mmg.html | dead-url=yes }}.
-* {{Citation | last=McCarthy | first=John | last2 = Minsky | first2 = Marvin | last3 = Rochester | first3 = Nathan | last4 = Shannon | first4 = Claude | url = http://www-formal.stanford.edu/jmc/history/dartmouth/dartmouth.html | title = A Proposal for the Dartmouth Summer Research Project on Artificial Intelligence | year = 1955 | author-link = John McCarthy (computer scientist) | author2-link = Marvin Minsky | author3-link = Nathan Rochester | author4-link = Claude Shannon}}.
+* {{Citation | last = McCarthy | first = John | last2 = Minsky | first2 = Marvin | last3 = Rochester | first3 = Nathan | last4 = Shannon | first4 = Claude | url = http://www-formal.stanford.edu/jmc/history/dartmouth/dartmouth.html | title = A Proposal for the Dartmouth Summer Research Project on Artificial Intelligence | year = 1955 | author-link = John McCarthy (computer scientist) | author2-link = Marvin Minsky | author3-link = Nathan Rochester | author4-link = Claude Shannon | accessdate = 2011-02-09 | archive-date = 2007-08-26 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20070826230310/http://www-formal.stanford.edu/jmc/history/dartmouth/dartmouth.html | dead-url = no }}.
-* {{Citation | last=McDermott | first=Drew | title = How Intelligent is Deep Blue | url=http://www.psych.utoronto.ca/~reingold/courses/ai/cache/mcdermott.html | newspaper= New York Times |date=May 14, 1997}}
+* {{Citation | last=McDermott | first=Drew | title=How Intelligent is Deep Blue | url=http://www.psych.utoronto.ca/~reingold/courses/ai/cache/mcdermott.html | newspaper=New York Times | date=May 14, 1997 | accessdate=2011-02-09 | archive-date=2007-10-04 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071004234354/http://www.psych.utoronto.ca/~reingold/courses/ai/cache/mcdermott.html | dead-url=yes }}
 * {{Citation | last=Moravec | first=Hans | year = 1988 | title = Mind Children | publisher = Harvard University Press | author-link =Hans Moravec }}
 * {{Citation | unused_data=DUPLICATE DATA: publisher=place= New York | last=Newell | first=Allen | last2 = Simon | first2=H. A. | year = 1963 | contribution=GPS: A Program that Simulates Human Thought| title=Computers and Thought | editor-last= Feigenbaum | editor-first= E.A. |editor2-last= Feldman |editor2-first= J. |publisher= McGraw-Hill | author-link=Allen Newell | authorlink2 = Herbert Simon}}
-* {{Citation | last = Newell | first = Allen | last2 = Simon | first2=H. A. | year = 1976 | contribution=Computer Science as Empirical Inquiry: Symbols and Search| title=Communications of the ACM |volume= 19| author-link=Allen Newell | url = http://www.rci.rutgers.edu/~cfs/472_html/AI_SEARCH/PSS/PSSH4.html | authorlink2=Herbert Simon|issue=3}}
+* {{Citation | last = Newell | first = Allen | last2 = Simon | first2 = H. A. | year = 1976 | contribution = Computer Science as Empirical Inquiry: Symbols and Search | title = Communications of the ACM | volume = 19 | author-link = Allen Newell | url = http://www.rci.rutgers.edu/~cfs/472_html/AI_SEARCH/PSS/PSSH4.html | authorlink2 = Herbert Simon | issue = 3 | accessdate = 2011-02-09 | archive-date = 2008-10-07 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20081007162810/http://www.rci.rutgers.edu/~cfs/472_html/AI_SEARCH/PSS/PSSH4.html | dead-url = yes }}
 * {{Russell Norvig 2003}}
 * {{Citation | last=Penrose |first=Roger|title= [[The Emperor's New Mind|The Emperor's New Mind: Concerning Computers, Minds, and The Laws of Physics]]|publisher= Oxford University Press| year=1989|isbn=0-14-014534-6 |author-link=Roger Penrose}}
-* {{Citation | last=Searle | first=John | year=1980 | url = http://members.aol.com/NeoNoetics/MindsBrainsPrograms.html  | title = Minds, Brains and Programs | journal = Behavioral and Brain Sciences | volume = 3| issue = 3| pages= 417–457  | author-link=John Searle | doi=10.1017/S0140525X00005756}}
+* {{Citation | last=Searle | first=John | year=1980 | url=http://members.aol.com/NeoNoetics/MindsBrainsPrograms.html | title=Minds, Brains and Programs | journal=Behavioral and Brain Sciences | volume=3 | issue=3 | pages=417–457 | author-link=John Searle | doi=10.1017/S0140525X00005756 | archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20000823030455/http://members.aol.com/NeoNoetics/MindsBrainsPrograms.html | archivedate=2000-08-23 | accessdate=2011-02-09 | dead-url=no }}
 * {{Citation | last=Searle | first=John | year=1992 | title=The Rediscovery of the  Mind|publisher=M.I.T. Press|location=Cambridge, Massachusetts}}
 * {{Citation | last=Searle | first=John | author-link=John Searle | year = 1999 | title = Mind, language and society  | isbn = 0465045219 | publisher = Basic Books | location = New York, NY | oclc = 231867665 43689264 }}
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