Filsafat kecerdasan buatan

Filsafat kecerdasan buatan berupaya menjawab pertanyaan seperti:^[1]

Dapatkah mesin bertindak secara cerdas? Dapatkah mesin menyelesaikan semua masalah yang akan diselesaikan seseorang dengan cara berpikir?
Apakah mesin memiliki budi dan kesadaran seperti manusia? Dapatkan mereka merasakan?
Apakah kecerdasan manusia dan mesin itu sama? Apakah otak manusia pada dasarnya merupakan sebuah komputer?

Tiga pertanyaan tersebut melambangkan ketertarikan peneliti, filsuf, dan ilmuwan kognitif kecerdasan buatan. Jawaban terhadap pertanyaan-pertanyaan tersebut bergantung pada bagaimana seseorang mendefinisikan "kecerdasan" atau "kesadaran" dan "mesin" mana yang sedang diperbincangkan.

Dalil-dalil penting dalam kecerdasan buatan adalah:

"Konvensi sopan" Turing: Apabila mesin bertindak secerdas manusia, maka mesin sama cerdasnya dengan manusia.^[2]
Usulan Dartmouth: "Setiap aspek pembelajaran atau ciri lain kecerdasan dapat digambarkan secara tepat sehingga sebuah mesin dapat diciptakan untuk merangsangnya."^[3]
Hipotesis sistem lambang fisik Newell dan Simon: "Sistem lambang fisik mempunyai arti tindakan kecerdasan umum yang penting dan mencukupi."^[4]
Hipotesis kecerdasan buatan kuat Searle: "Komputer yang diprogram dengan tepat dengan input dan output yang benar punya budi seperti manusia."^[5]
Mekanisme Hobbes: "Nalar tidak lain adalah perhitungan."^[6]

Catatan kaki

^ Russell & Norvig 2003, hlm. 947 define the philosophy of AI as consisting of the first two questions, and the additional question of the ethics of artificial intelligence. Fearn 2007, hlm. 55 writes "In the current literature, philosophy has to chief roles: to determine whether or not such machines would be conscious, and, second, to predict whether or not such machines are possible." The last question bears on the first two.
^ This is a paraphrase of the essential point of the Turing Test. Turing 1950, Haugeland 1985, hlm. 6–9, Crevier 1993, hlm. 24, Russell & Norvig 2003, hlm. 2–3 and 948
^ McCarthy et al. 1955. This assertion was printed in the program for the Dartmouth Conference of 1956, widely considered the "birth of AI."also Crevier 1993, hlm. 28
^ Newell & Simon 1976 and Russell & Norvig 2003, hlm. 18
^ This version is from (Searle 1999), and is also quoted in Dennett 1991, hlm. 435. Searle's original formulation was "The appropriately programmed computer really is a mind, in the sense that computers given the right programs can be literally said to understand and have other cognitive states." (Searle 1980, hlm. 1). Strong AI is defined similarly by (Russell & Norvig 2003, hlm. 947): "The assertion that machines could possibly act intelligently (or, perhaps better, act as if they were intelligent) is called the 'weak AI' hypothesis by philosophers, and the assertion that machines that do so are actually thinking (as opposed to simulating thinking) is called the 'strong AI' hypothesis."
^ Hobbes 1651, chpt. 5

Referensi

Blackmore, Susan (2005), Consciousness: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford University Press
Brooks, Rodney (1990), "Elephants Don't Play Chess" (PDF), Robotics and Autonomous Systems, 6: 3–15, doi:10.1016/S0921-8890(05)80025-9, diakses tanggal 2007-08-30
Chalmers, David J (1996), The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory, Oxford University Press, New York, ISBN 0-19-511789-1 (Pbk.) Periksa nilai: invalid character |isbn= (bantuan)
Cole, David (Fall 2004), "The Chinese Room Argument", dalam Zalta, Edward N., The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy .
Dennett, Daniel (1991), Consciousness Explained, The Penguin Press, ISBN 0-7139-9037-6
Dreyfus, Hubert (1972), What Computers Can't Do, New York: MIT Press, ISBN 0060110821
Dreyfus, Hubert (1979), What Computers Still Can't Do, New York: MIT Press .
Dreyfus, Hubert; Dreyfus, Stuart (1986), Mind over Machine: The Power of Human Intuition and Expertise in the Era of the Computer, Oxford, UK: Blackwell
Fearn, Nicholas (2007), The Latest Answers to the Oldest Questions: A Philosophical Adventure with the World's Greatest Thinkers, New York: Grove Press
Gladwell, Malcolm (2005), Blink: The Power of Thinking Without Thinking, Boston: Little, Brown, ISBN 0-316-17232-4 .
Harnad, Stevan (2001), "What's Wrong and Right About Searle's Chinese Room Argument?", dalam Bishop, M.; Preston, J., Essays on Searle's Chinese Room Argument, Oxford University Press
Hobbes (1651), Leviathan .
Hofstadter, Douglas (1979), Gödel, Escher, Bach: an Eternal Golden Braid .
Horst, Steven (Fall 2005), "The Computational Theory of Mind", dalam Zalta, Edward N., The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy .
Kurzweil, Ray (2005), The Singularity is Near, New York: Viking Press, ISBN 0-670-03384-7 .
Lucas, John (1961), "Minds, Machines and Gödel", dalam Anderson, A.R., Minds and Machines .
McCarthy, John; Minsky, Marvin; Rochester, Nathan; Shannon, Claude (1955), A Proposal for the Dartmouth Summer Research Project on Artificial Intelligence .
McDermott, Drew (May 14, 1997), "How Intelligent is Deep Blue", New York Times, diarsipkan dari versi asli tanggal 2007-10-04, diakses tanggal 2011-02-09
Moravec, Hans (1988), Mind Children, Harvard University Press
Newell, Allen; Simon, H. A. (1963), "GPS: A Program that Simulates Human Thought", dalam Feigenbaum, E.A.; Feldman, J., Computers and Thought, McGraw-Hill
Newell, Allen; Simon, H. A. (1976), "Computer Science as Empirical Inquiry: Symbols and Search", Communications of the ACM, 19 (3), diarsipkan dari versi asli tanggal 2008-10-07, diakses tanggal 2011-02-09
Templat:Russell Norvig 2003
Penrose, Roger (1989), The Emperor's New Mind: Concerning Computers, Minds, and The Laws of Physics, Oxford University Press, ISBN 0-14-014534-6
Searle, John (1980), "Minds, Brains and Programs", Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (3): 417–457, doi:10.1017/S0140525X00005756, diarsipkan dari versi asli tanggal 2000-08-23, diakses tanggal 2011-02-09
Searle, John (1992), The Rediscovery of the Mind, Cambridge, Massachusetts: M.I.T. Press
Searle, John (1999), Mind, language and society, New York, NY: Basic Books, ISBN 0465045219, OCLC 231867665 43689264 Periksa nilai |oclc= (bantuan)

Artikel bertopik filsafat ini adalah sebuah rintisan. Anda dapat membantu Wikipedia dengan mengembangkannya.

[1] Russell & Norvig 2003, hlm. 947 define the philosophy of AI as consisting of the first two questions, and the additional question of the ethics of artificial intelligence. Fearn 2007, hlm. 55 writes "In the current literature, philosophy has to chief roles: to determine whether or not such machines would be conscious, and, second, to predict whether or not such machines are possible." The last question bears on the first two.

[T-2] This is a paraphrase of the essential point of the Turing Test. Turing 1950, Haugeland 1985, hlm. 6–9, Crevier 1993, hlm. 24, Russell & Norvig 2003, hlm. 2–3 and 948

[MMRS-3] McCarthy et al. 1955. This assertion was printed in the program for the Dartmouth Conference of 1956, widely considered the "birth of AI."also Crevier 1993, hlm. 28

[NS-4] Newell & Simon 1976 and Russell & Norvig 2003, hlm. 18

[SWAI-5] This version is from (Searle 1999), and is also quoted in Dennett 1991, hlm. 435. Searle's original formulation was "The appropriately programmed computer really is a mind, in the sense that computers given the right programs can be literally said to understand and have other cognitive states." (Searle 1980, hlm. 1). Strong AI is defined similarly by (Russell & Norvig 2003, hlm. 947): "The assertion that machines could possibly act intelligently (or, perhaps better, act as if they were intelligent) is called the 'weak AI' hypothesis by philosophers, and the assertion that machines that do so are actually thinking (as opposed to simulating thinking) is called the 'strong AI' hypothesis."

[H-6] Hobbes 1651, chpt. 5

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