Konflik Chad-Libya

Perang Chad-Libia
Berkas:Chadian soldiers in Toyota pickup truck.jpg Tentara Chad di mobil pengangkut Toyota
Tanggal 1978–1987 Lokasi Chad Hasil Kekalahan Libia
Pihak terlibat
Libya GUNT	Chad Prancis Republik Demokratik Kongo
Tokoh dan pemimpin
Muammar al-Gaddafi Goukouni Oueddei	Hissène Habré
Korban
1000	Tidak diketahui

Perang Chad-Libya adalah sebuah konflik militer di Chad pada tahun 1978 sampai tahun 1987, perang ini adalah perang antara Libia dan Chad. Namun keikutsertaan Libia dalam permasalahan Chad sudah terjadi sebelum tahun 1978, walaupun Muammar al-Gaddafi naik tahta pada tahun 1969, perang ini dimulai karena perpanjangan dari Perang Saudara Chad di Chad Utara tahun 1968. Konflik ini ditandai dengan keikutsertaan Libia di Chad, pada tahun 1978, 1979, 1980–1981 dan 1983–1987. Pada semua ini, Gaddafi telah mendukung beberapa faksi yang berpartisipasi dalam perang sipil, dimana musuh dari Libia menerima bantuan dari pemerintahan Perancis, dimana hal itu menyebabkan adanya campur tangan militer untuk menyelamatkan pemerintah Chad pada tahun 1978, 1983 dan 1986.

Latar belakang militer dari perang ini digambarkan pada tahun 1978, dengan Libia memberi bantuan artileri, angkatan udara dan infantri, dan mengambil bagian terbesar dalam mengamati dan berperang. Latar belakang ini akhirnya berubah pada tahun 1986, dimana perang akan berakhir, ketika semua pasukan Chad yang melawan Libia merebut Chad Utara dengan persatuan yang tidak pernah dilihat sebelumnya di Chad. Ini menghilangkan kebiasaan infantri pasukan Libia, terutama saat mereka melawan tank, mereka telah menyediakan anti-tank dan anti-misil, namun melemahkan kekuatan senjata api Libia. Yang terjadi selanjutnya adalah Perang Toyota, dimana pasukan Libia dapat dikalahkan dan dipukul mundur oleh Chad, dan juga mengakhiri konflik ini.

Alasan keikutsertaan Gaddafi dalam konflik di Chad adalah ambisinya atas daerah Jalur Aouzou, bagian terutara Chad yang diklaim sebagai bagian dari Libia yang belum disahkan dalam perjanjian pada saat periode kolonial. Pada tahun 1972, keinginannya tercapai, dalam evaluasi dari ahli sejarah Mario Azevedo, didirikannya negara bagian klien di bawah Libia, sebuah republik Islam dimodelkan setelah jamahiriya, yang akan membawa hubungan dekat dengan Libia, dan mengambil alih Jalur Aouzou, mengusir kekuasaan Perancis dari daerah itu, dan menggunakan Chad sebagai tempat untuk memperluas kekuasaannya di Afrika Tengah.

Latar belakang

Pendudukan Jalur Aozou

Keikutsertaan Libia di Chad mulai terlihat pada tahun 1968, selama periode Perang Saudara Chad, dimana pemberontak Muslim FROLINAT melaksanakan perang gerilya terhadap Presiden Chad, François Tombalbaye yang beragama Kristen di daerah utara Chad, yaitu di Prefektur BET. Selalu ada hubungan kuat di daerah perbatasan Chad-Libia, oleh karena itu, Raja Libia, Idris I merasa perlu untuk memberikan bantuan kepada FROLINAT, dan juga untuk mempertahankan hubungan baik dengan Chad dan pelindungnya, Perancis, Idris membatasi bantuannya dengan hanya memberikan tempat perlindungan untuk pemberontak FROLINAT dan bantuan logistik ,dan juga Idris tidak memberi bantuan berupa senjata.

Namun, semua hal ini berubah dengan terjadinya kudeta pada tanggal 1 September 1969 di Libia. Kudeta ini menjatuhkan Idris, sehingga Muammar al-Gaddafi naik tahta. Gaddafi pun mengklaim Jalur Aouzou di daerah Chad Utara dengan merujuk kepada perjanjian tidak resmi pada tahun 1935, tentang pembagian daerah kolonial antara Italia dan Perancis di daerah Chad dan Libia. Pengklaiman ini sudah dinyatakan pada tahun 1954, dimana Idris mencoba untuk menduduki Aouzou, tetapi pasukannya dapat dikalahkan oleh tentara Perancis.

Jalur Aouzou ditandai dengan warna biru pada peta ini.

Karena waspada akan FROLINAT, Gaddafi mengunjungi FROLINAT pada tahun 1970. Organisasi ini berguna untuk kebutuhannya dan dengan bantuan negara-negara blok Uni Soviet, misalnya Jerman Timur, melatih dan mempersenjatai pasukan perlawanan, dan memberi mereka senjata dan uang. Pada tanggal 27 Agustus 1971, Gaddafi berani untuk melakukan kudeta terhadap Tombalbaye, namun kudeta ini gagal. Kudeta ini dilaksanakan karena kegelisahan Libia, karena pada tanggal 24 Juli, terjadi upaya rekonsiliasi Muslim-Kristen dengan penyerahan ½ cabinet Chad kepada politikus Muslim. Walaupun ditolak oleh FROLINAT, hal ini dianggap Gaddafi sebagai ancaman atas kekuasaannya di Chad.

Pada hari yang sama, Tombalbaye memutuskan hubungan diplomatik dengan Libia, dan mengundang grup oposisi Libia untuk pergi ke Chad, dan mulai mengklaim wilayah Fezzan. Respon Gaddafi secara resmi mengakui pada 17 September bahwa FROLINAT sebagai tapak kaki Pemerintahan Chad, dan pada bulan Oktober, menteri luar negeri Chad, Baba Hassan mengumumkan di PBB ide tentang ekspansi .

Dengan adanya tekanan Perancis terhadap Libia, dan dengan Hamani Diori, Presiden Niger memainkan peran sebagai pelerai, kedua Negara melanjutkan hubungan diplomasi pada tanggal 17 April 1972. Tidak lama kemudian, Tombalbaye memutuskan hubungan diplomatik dengan Israel dan dikatakan telah diterima secara rahasia pada 28 November untuk menyerahkan Jalur Aouzou kepada Libia. Untuk penukaran, Gaddafi memberikan 40 juta pound kepada Presiden Chad dan kedua Negara menandatangani Perjanjian Persahabatan pada bulan Desember. Gaddafi menarik bantuan kepada FROLINAT dan memaksa pemimpinnya, Abba Siddick, untuk memindahkan bentengnya dari Tripoli ke kota Algiers. Relasi baik diterima untuk tahun-tahun selanjutnya, dan relasi baik ini ditandai dengan kunjungan Gaddafi ke ibukota negara Chad , N'Djamena pada Maret 1974, dan pada bulan yang sama, sebuah bank didirikan untuk memberikan kepada Chad dana investasi..

Enam bulan setelah perjanjian pada tahun 1972, pasukan Libia dipindah ke Jalur Aouzou dan mendirikan tepat di Aouzou sebuah lapangan udara yang dilindungi oleh anti-misil. Administrasi sipil didirikan, dan sekitar ribuan penduduk di daerah Aozou berubah kewarganegaraan menjadi warna negara. Selain itu, juga dibuat peta negara Libia yang baru dan Jalur Aouzou dimasukan kedalam bagian dari Libia.

Syarat yang pasti atas Libia menduduki Aouzou masih misterius dan diperdebatkan. Keberadaan persetujuan rahasia antara Tombalbaye dan Gaddafi terungkap hanya pada tahun 1988, saat Presiden Libia mempertunjukan salinan dari surat dimana Tombalbaye mengakui pengklaiman Libia. Namun, beberapa sarjan seperti Bernard Lanne membantah dan menyatakan bahwa tidak pernah ada persetujuan resmi apapun, dan Tombalbaye menemukan jalan yang sangat berguna untuknya tidak untuk menyebutkan pendudukan bagian daerahnya. Selain itu, Libia tidak dapat menunjukan salinan asli dari persetujuan pada saat kasus Aouzou dibawa pada tahun 1993 ke Mahkamah Internasional.

Ekspansi atas Pemberontakan

Hubungan ini tidak berlangsung lama, karena pada tanggal 13 April 1975, sebuah kudeta terjadi dan menurunkan Tombalbaye, lalu Jendral Felix Malloum naik tahta. Alasan dari kudeta ini adalah perlawanan atas kebijakan Tombalbaye dalam hal hubungan dengan Libia. Gaddafi merasa kudeta ini adalah ancaman atas kekuasaannya di Chad dan akhirnya ia melanjutkan bantuannya kepada FROLINAT.

Pada bulan April tahun 1976, terjadi usaha pembunuhan Malloum yang didukung oleh Gaddafi, dan pada tahun yang sama tentara Libia mulai melakukan perampokan di daerah Chad Tengah, dan tentara Libia bekerja sama dengan pasukan FROLINAT.

Aktivis Libia mulai membangkitkan kepentingan dalam faksi terkuat dimana FROLINAT berpisah dari faksi ini, yaitu CCFAN. Karena isu ketertarikan pendukung Libia, pasukan perlawanan terpecah pada Oktober 1976, dengan minoritas milisi membentuk Angkatan Bersenjata Utara (FAN), dibentuk oleh orang yang anti Libia, Hissène Habré, dimana sebagian besar mau menerima aliansi dengan Gaddafi, yang dipimpin oleh Goukouni Oueddei. Grup ini nantinya mengganti namanya menjadi Angkatan Bersenjata Rakyat.

Pada tahun-tahun ini, bantuan Gaddafi tidaklah banyak, dan hanya memberi senjata yang terbatas jumlahnya. Namun, hal ini mulai berubah pada bulan Februari tahun 1977, dimana orang Libia memberi pasukan Goukouni dengan ratusan AK-47, lusinan basoka, 81 dan 82mm mortar dan meriam. Karena Angkatan Bersenjata Rakyat dipersenjatai dengan senjata-senjata ini, Angkatan Bersenjata Rakyat mulai menyerang benteng Angkatan Bersenjata Chad (FAT) di Bardai, Zouar di Tibesti dan Ounianga Kebir di Borkou. Goukouni akhirnya memimpin serangan untuk menguasai Tibesti. Bardai telah diserang sejak 22 Juni dan menyerah pada tanggak 4 Juli. Zouar sendiri pun dievakuasi oleh Chad dan dikuasai oleh Libia. FAT kehilangan 300 orang, dan beberapa persediaan militer jatuh ke tangan FAT. Ounianga diserang pada tanggal 20 Juni, tetapi diselamatkan oleh kehadiran penasehat militer Perancis disana.

Akibat isu yang mengatakan Jalur Aozou digunakan oleh Libia sebagai markas untuk intervensi lebih dalam di Chad, Malloum membawa kasus pendudukan Aozou ke PBB dan Uni Afrika. Malloum juga membutuhkan sekutu baru, oleh karena itu, ia bernegosiasi dengan Habré, dan menghasikan Persetujuan Khartoum pada bulan September. Persetujuan ini dirahasiakan sampai tanggal 22 Januari, saat dimana sebuah Piagam Fundamental ditandatangani, diikuti dengan diikuti dengan dibentuknya Pemerintahan baru pada tanggal 29 Agustus 1978 dengan Habré sebagai Perdana Menteri. Persetujuan Malloum-Habré diangkat oleh Sudan dan Saudi Arabia, keduanya takut bahwa Chad akan dikontrol oleh Gaddafi.

Reaksi Libia

Persetujuan Malloum-Habré dianggap Gaddafi sebagai ancaman serius atas kekuasaannya di Chad, dan reaksi dari Libia adalah peningkatan intervensi Libia di Chad. Untuk pertama kalinya terjadi intervensi aktif pasukan angkatan darat Libia, yaitu Angkatan Bersenjata Rakyat yang dimulai pada tanggal 29 Januari 1978 dengan melakukan serangan Ibrahim Abatcha dimana mereka menyerang pos-pos yang dimiliki pemerintah Chad di daerah utara Chad, pos-pos tersebut adalah Faya-Largeau, Fada dan Ounianga Kebir. Serangan ini berhasil, Goukouni dan orang Libia menguasai seluruh Prefektur BET.

Pertempuran antara pasukan Angkatan Bersenjata Rakyat-Libya dan pasukan Chad mengambil tempat di Faya-Largeau, ibukota BET. Kota itu dilindungi oleh 5.000 pasukan, dan kota tersebut jatuh pada tanggal 18 Februari setelah pertempuran yang dilakukan oleh 2.500 pemberontak, didukung oleh sekitar 4.000 pasukan Libia. Libia tidak berparsitipasi langsung dalam pertempuran, namun Libia menyediakan artileri dan bantuan. Pemberontak juga lebih bersenjata daripada sebelumnya, dimana mereka menunjukan misil Strela 2.

Goukouni menangkap sekitar 2.500 tawanan atas keberhasilan ini, dan hasilnya adalah Pasukan Chad kehilangan sekitar 20% pasukannya, dan penjaga nasional benar-benar menipis karena jatuhnya Fada dan Faya. Goukouni menggunakan kemenangan ini untuk memperkuat posisinya di FROLINAT(selama kongres yang disponsori Libia yang diadakan pada bulan Maret di Faya, faksi utama pemberontak mempersatukan kembali kelompok mereka dan mencalonkan Goukouni sebagai sekretaris jendral FROLINAT.

Reaksi Malloum atas serangan Goukouni-Gaddafi adalah memutuskan hubungan diplomatic dengan Libia pada tanggal 6 Februari dan melaporkan kepada PBB tentang intervensi Libia dalam hal ini. Isu tentang pendudukan Jalur Aouzou oleh Libia pun muncul lagi. Pada tanggal 19 Februari, setelah jatuhnya Faya, Malloum terpaksa menerima gencatan senjata dan menarik tuntutannya. Gencatan senjata dapat tercapai karena Libia telah menghentikan serangan Goukouni, selain itu Chad mendapat tekanan dari Perancis.

Malloum dan Gaddafi kembali membuka hubungan diplomatic pada tanggal 24 Februari di Sebha di Libia, dimana sebuah konferensi internasional sedang diadakan dimana Presiden Niger Seyni Kountché dan Wakil Presiden Sudan hadir sebagai pelerai, dan juga dibawah tekanan dari Perancis, Sudan dan Zaire, Malloum terpaksa menandatangani Persetujuan Benghazi pada tanggal 27 Maret, dimana ia mengakui FROLINAT. Selain itu, persetujuan juga menghasilkan dibentuknya komite gabungan militer Libia—Niger, dimana tugasnya adalah melaksanakan persetujuan itu. Persetujuan ini juga berisi kondisi lain untuk Libia, dimana diminta agar semua kehadiran pasukan Perancis di Chad dihilangkan. Persetujuan ini merupakan strategi Gaddafi untuk memperkuat kekuasaannya di Chad serta untuk menyingkirkan Goukouni dari kekuasaan FROLINAT. Perjanjian ini juga melemahkan kewibawaan Malloum di Chad selatan, dimana mereka menyatakan ini adalah bukti kelemahan kepemimpinannya.

Pada tanggal 15 April, beberapa hari setelah gencatan senjata, Goukouni meninggalkan Faya dan meninggalkan 800 garnisiun disana, lalu pergi menyerbu ibukota Chad, N'Djamena.

Permintaan kembalinya pasukan Perancis ke Chad telah dilakukan tahun 1977, setelah serangan pertama Goukouni. Malloum meminta kembalinya militer Perancis, namun Presiden Perancis Valéry Giscard d'Estaing awalnya malas untuk memasuki dirinya sebelum adanya pemilihan legislatif, yang diadakan pada Maret 1978, selain itu, Perancis takut jika hubungan diplomatik yang menguntungkan dengan Libia terganggu. Pada akhirnya, kemunduran situasi yang deras di Chad membuat Presiden Perancis pada tanggal 20 Februari 1978 menjalankan Operasi Tacaud, dimana pada bulan April mengirim sekitar 2.500 pasukan di Chad untuk menyelamatkan ibukota dari pemberontak.

Pertempuran yang menentukan terjadi di Ati, sebuah kota yang berlokasi 270 mili barat daya dari N’Djamena. Garnisiun kota yang berjumlah 1.500 tentara diserang pada tanggal 19 Mei oleh pemberontak FROLINAT, yang dipersenjatai dengan persenjataan modern dan artileri. Garnisiun itu diringankan dengan kedatangan bantuan dari pasukan Chad, dan lebih penting lagi, kedatangan Legiun luar negeri Perancis dan Regiment of Marine Infantry ketiga. Dalam waktu 2 hari, FROLINAT dapat dipukul mundur dengan kekalahan yang berat, sebuah kemenangan yang dipertegas pada bulan Juni dengan pertempuran di Djedaa, dimana FROLINAT mengakui kekalahannya dan mundur ke utara setelah kehilangan 2.000 orang dan meninggalkan persenjataan modern yang mereka bawa. Kunci dalam pertempuran ini adalah keunggulan angkatan udara Perancis, dimana pesawat Libia menolak untuk melawan pesawat Perancis.

Kesulitan Libya

Hanya beberapa bulan setelah serangan yang gagal terhadap N’Djamena, pertikaian dalam FROLINAT menghancurkan kesatuan FROLINAT serta melemahkan kekuasaan Libia di Chad. Pada malam 27 Agustus, Ahmat Acyl, pemimpin Pasukan Volcan menyerang Faya-Largeau dengan bantuan pasukan Libya dimana terdapat sebuah usaha oleh Gaddafi untuk menyingkirkan Goukouni dari kepemimpinan FROLINAT, dan menggantinya dengan Acyl. Goukoni bereaksi dengan mengeluarkan semua kehadiran penasehat militer Libya di Chad dan mulai mencari kompromi dengan Perancis.

Akibat dari perselisihan antara Gaddafi dan Goukouni adalah permasalahan etnik dan politik. FROLINAT terbagi diantara orang Arab, seperti Acyl, dan Toubou, seperti Goukouni dan Habré. Divisi etnik ini juga menggambarkan sikap yang berbeda ke arah Gaddafi dan buku hijaunya. Dalam fakta-fakta, Goukouni dan pengikutnya telah menunjukan bahwa mereka malas untuk mengikuti permintaan Gaddafi untuk membuat buku hijau peraturan resmi FROLINAT, dan pertama telah mencoba untuk mengambil waktu, meninggalkan pertanyaan untuk menyelesaikan reunifikasi dari pergerakan. Ketika unifikasi selesai, dan Gaddafi menekan kembali untuk adopsi buku hijau, pertikaian di dewan revolusi menjadi nyata, dengan banyak menyatakan kesetiaan mereka kepada program partai pergerakan tahun 1966 ketika Ibrahim Abatcha menjadi sekretaris jendral pertama, ketika yang lain, diantara Acyl, secara penuh menganut ide Kolonel.

Di N'Djamena, kehadiran 2 angkatan bersenjata yang sebaya, FAN Perdana Menteri dan FAT Presiden Malloum, mempersiapkan panggung pertempuran N'Djamena, which was to bring about the collapse of the State and the ascent to power of the Northern elite. A minor incident escalated on February 12 1979 into heavy fighting between Habré and Malloum's forces, and the battle intensified on February 19 when Goukouni's men entered in the capital to fight alongside Habré against the FAT. It is estimated that by March 16, when the first international peace conference took place, 2,000–5,000 people were killed and 60,000–70,000 forced to flee the capital, and the greatly diminished Chadian army left the capital in the rebels' hand and reorganized itself in the south under the leadership of Wadel Abdelkader Kamougué. During the battle, the French garrison stood passively by, even helping Habré in certain circumstances, as when they demanded the Chad Air Force to stop its bombings.

An international peace conference was held in Kano in Nigeria, to which Chad's bordering states participated with Malloum for the Chadian army, Habré for the FAN and Goukouni for the Angkatan Bersenjata Rakyat. The An accord was signed on March 16 by all those present, and Malloum resigned, replaced by a Council of State under the chairmanship of Goukouni. This was a result of Nigerian and French pressures on Goukouni and Habré to share power; the French in particular saw this as part of their strategy to cut all ties between Goukouni and Gaddafi. A few weeks later, the same factions formed the Transitional Government of National Unity (GUNT), kept together to a considerable extent by the common desire to see Libya out of Chad.

Despite signing the Kano Accord, Libya was incensed that the GUNT did not include any of the leaders of the Volcan Army and had not recognized Libyan claims on the Aouzou Strip. Already since 13 April there had been some minor Libyan military activity in northern Chad, and support was provided to the secessionist movement in the south, but a major response came only after June 25, when the ultimatum for the formation of a new, more inclusive, coalition government posed by Chad's bordering states to the GUNT expired. On June 26 2,500 Libyan troops invaded Chad directed to Faya-Largeau; these forces were first stymied by Goukouni's militiamen, and then forced to retreat, especially due to French reconnaissance planes and bombers (the Chadian government had, when the attack started, appealed for French help). In the same month, the factions excluded by the GUNT founded in northern Chad with Libyan military support a counter-government, the Front for Joint Provisional Action (FACP).

The fighting with Libya, the imposition by Nigeria of an economic boycott and international pressure brought to a new international peace conference in Lagos in August, to which all eleven factions present in Chad paricipated. A new accord was signed on August 21, under which a new GUNT was to be formed, open to all factions. The French troops were to leave Chad, and be replaced by a multinational African peace force. The new GUNT took office in November, with Goukouni President, Kamougué Vice-President, Habré Defence Minister and Acyl Foreign Minister. Despite the presence of Habré, the new composition of the GUNT had enough pro-Libyans to satisfy Gaddafi.

Intervensi Libia

Hal ini menjadi jelas sejak awal bahwa Habré mengisolasi dirinya dari anggota GUNT lainnya, dimana ia diremehkan oleh anggota GUNT lainnya. Habré's hostility for Libya's influence in Chad united itself with his ambition and ruthlessness: observers concluded that the warlord would never be content with anything short of the highest office. In such a context it was thought that sooner or later an armed confrontation between Habré and the pro-Libyan factions would take place, and more importantly, between Habré and Goukouni.

As expected, clashes in the capital between Habré's FAN and pro-Libyan groups became progressively more serious; at the end, on March 22 1980 a minor incident, like in 1979 with the first, triggered the second battle of N'Djamena. In ten days the clashes between the FAN and Goukouni's Angkatan Bersenjata Rakyat, who both had 1,000–1,500 troops in the city, had caused thousands of casualties and the flight of about half the capital's population. The few remaining French troops, who left on May 4, proclaimed themselves neutral, as did the Zairian peace force.

While the FAN was supplied economically and militarily by Sudan and Egypt, Goukouni received shortly after the beginning of the battle the armed support of Kamougué's FAT and Acyl's CDR, and was provided with Libyan artillery. On June 6, the FAN assumed control of the city of Faya; this alarmed Goukouni, and he signed on June 15 a Treaty of Friendship with Libya. The treaty gave Libya a free hand in Chad, legitimising its presence in that country: this was especially evident in the first article of the treaty, where it was written that the two countries were committed to mutual defence, and a threat against one constituted a threat against the other.

Beginning in October, Libyan troops airlifted to the Aouzou Strip operated in conjunction with Goukouni's forces to reoccupy Faya. The city was then used as an assembly point for tanks, artillery and armored vehicles that moved south against the capital of N'Djamena.

An attack started on December 6, spearheaded by Soviet T-54 and T-55 tanks and reportedly coordinated by advisors from the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic, brought the fall of the capital on December 16. The Libyan force, numbering between 7,000 and 9,000 men of regular units and the paramilitary Pan-African Islamic Legion, 60 tanks, and other armored vehicles, had been ferried across 1,100 kilometers of desert from Libya's southern border, partly by airlift and tank transporters and partly under their own power. The border itself was 1,000 to 1,100 kilometers from Libya's main bases on the Mediterranean coast. The Libyan intervention demonstrated an impressive logistical ability, and provided Gaddafi with his first military victory and a substantial political achievement.

While forced into exile and with his forces confined to the frontier zones of Darfur, Habré remained defiant: on December 31 he announced in Dakar he would resume fighting as a guerilla against the GUNT.

Libyan withdrawal

On January 6 1981 a joint comuniqué was issued in Tripoli by Gaddafi and Goukouni that Libya and Chad had decided "to work to achieve full unity between the two countries". The merger plan caused strong adverse reaction in Africa, and was immediately condemned by France, that on January 11 offered to strengthen French garrisons in friendly African States and placed on January 15 the French Mediterranean fleet on alert. Libya answered by threatening to impose an oil embargo, while France menaced to react if Libya attacked another bordering country. The accord was also opposed by all GUNT ministers present with Goukouni at Tripoli, with the exception of Acyl.

Most observers believe that the reasons behind Goukouni's accepting the accord may be found in a mix of threats, intense pressure and the financial help promised by Gaddafi. Also, just before his visit to the Libyan capital, Goukouni had sent two of his commanders to Libya for consultations; at Tripoli, Goukouni learned by Gaddafi that they had been assassinated by "Libyan dissidents", and that if he didn't want to risk losing Libyan favour and lose power, he should accept the merger plan.

The importance of the opposition they met caused Gaddafi and Goukouni to downplay the importance of the communiqué, speaking of a "union" of peoples, and not of states, and as a "first step" towards closer collaboration. But the damage had been done, and the joint communiqué badly weakened Goukouni's prestige as a nationalist and a statesman.

Increasing international pressures against Libyan presence in Chad, were at first met by Goukouni's stating that the Libyans were present in Chad because requested by the government, and international mediators shuld simply accept the decision of Chad's legitimate government. In a meeting held in May Goukouni had became more accommodating, declaring that while the Libyan forces withdrawal was not a priority, he would accept the decisions of the OAU. Goukouni could hardly at the moment renounce to Libyan military support, that dealt with Habré's FAN, always supported by Egypt and Sudan, and funded through Egypt by the CIA.

In the meantime relations between Goukouni and Gaddafi started deteriorating. Libyan troops were stationed in various ponts of northern and central Chad, in numbers that had reached by January–February about 14,000 troops. The Libyan forces in the country created considerable annoyance in the GUNT, by supporting Acyl's faction in its disputes with the other militias, including the clashes held in late April with Goukouni's Angkatan Bersenjata Rakyat. There were also attempts to Libyanize the local population, that made many conclude that "unification" for Libya meant Arabization and the imposition of Libyan political culture, in particular of the Green Book.

Amid fighting in October between Gaddafi's Islamic Legionnaires and Goukouni's troops, and rumors that Acyl was planning a coup d'état to assume the leadership of the GUNT, Goukouni demanded on October 29 the complete and unequivocal withdrawal of Libyan forces from Chadian territory, which, beginning with the capital, was to be completed by December 31. The Libyans were to be replaced by an OAU Inter-African Force (IAF). Gaddafi complied, and by November 16 all Libyan forces had left Chad, redeploying in the Aouzou Strip.

Libya's prompt retreat took many observers by surprise. Reasons were to be found in Gaddafi's desire to host the OAU's annual conference in 1982 and assume the presidency of the for that year. Another point could be found in Libya's difficult situation in Chad, where without some popular and international acceptance for Libyan presence it would have been difficult to take the concrete risk of causing a war with Egypt and Sudan, with US support. This does not mean that Gaddafi had renounced the goals he had set for Chad, but that he now had to search for somebody else as Chad's leader, as Goukouni had proved himself unreliable.

Habré takes N'Djamena

The first IAF component to arrive in Chad were the Zairian paratroopers; they were followed by Nigerian and Senegalese forces, bringing the IAF to 3,275 men. Before the peace-keeping force was fully deployed, Habré had already taken advantage of Libya's withdrawal, and made massive inroads in eastern Chad, including the important city of Abéché, that fell on November 19. Next to fall was in early January Oum Hadjer, at only 100 miles from Ati, the last relevant town before the capital. The GUNT was saved for the moment by the IAF, the only credible military force confronting Habré, that prevented the FAN from taking Ati.

In the light of Habré's offensive, the OAU requested the GUNT to open reconciliation talks with Habré, a demand that was angrily refused by Goukouni; later he was to say:

"The OAU has deceived us. Our security was fully ensured by Libyan troops. The OAU put pressure on us to expel the Libyans. Now that they have gone, the organization has abandoned us while imposing on us a negotiated settlement with Hissein Habre"

In May the FAN started a final offensive, passing unhindered by the peacekeepers in Ati and Mongo. Goukouni, increasingly angered with the IAF's refusal to fight Habré, made an attempt to restore his relations with Libya, and reached Tripoli on May 23, but Gaddafi, burned by his experience the previous year, proclaimed his state neutrality in the civil war.

The GUNT forces attempted to make a last stand at Massaguet, 50 miles north of capital on the Abéché-N'Djamena road, but were defeated by the FAN on June 5 after a hard battle. Two days later Habré entered unopposed in N'Djamena, making him the de facto source of national government in Chad, while Goukouni fled the country seeking sanctuary in Cameroon.

Immediately after occupying the capital, Habré proceeded to consolidate his power by occupying the rest of the country. In barely six weeks he conquered southern Chad, destroying the FAT, Kamougué's militia, whose hopes for Libyan help failed to materialize. Also the rest of the country was submitted, with the exception of the Tibesti.

GUNT offensive

Since Gaddafi had kept himself mostly aloof in the months prior to the fall of N'Djamena, Habré hoped at first to reach an understanding with Libya, possibly through an accord with its proxy in Chad, the CDR's leader Acyl, who appeared receptive to dialogue. But Acyl died on July 19, replaced by Acheikh ibn Oumar, and the CDR was antagonized by Habré's eagerness to unify the country, making him overrun the CDR's domains.

Therefore, it was with Libyan support that Goukouni reassembled the GUNT, creating in October a National Peace Government with its seat in the Tibesti town of Bardai and claiming itself the legitimate government by the terms of the Lagos Accord. For the impending fight Goukouni could count on 3,000–4,000 men taken from several militias, later merged in an Armée Nationale de Libération (ANL) under the command of a Southerner, Negue Djogo.

Before Gaddafi could throw his full weight behind Goukouni, Habré attacked the GUNT in the Tibesti, but was repelled both in December 1982 and in January 1983. The following months saw the clashes intensify in the North, while talks, with even an exchange in March of visits between Tripoli and N'Djamena, broke down. Therefore, on March 17 Habré brought the Chad-Libya quarrel before the United Nations, asking for an urgent meeting of the UN Security Council to consider Libya's "aggression and occupation" of Chadian territory.

Gaddafi was ready now for an offensive. The decisive offensive began in June, when a 3,000 strong GUNT force invested Faya-Largeau, the main government stronghold in the North, that fell on June 25, and then rapidly proceeded towards Koro Toro, Oum Chalouba and Abéché, assuming control of the main routes towards N'Djamena. Libya, while helping with recruiting and training and providing the GUNT with heavy artillery, only committed a few thousand regular troops to the offensive, and most of these were artillery and logistic units. This may have been due to Gaddafi's desire that the conflict should be read as a Chadian internal affair.

The international community reacted adversely to the Libyan-backed offensive, in particular France and the United States. On the same day as the fall of Faya, the French Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson warned Libya that France would "not remain indifferent" to a new Libyan involvement in Chad, and on July 11 the French government accused again Libya of direct military support to the rebels. French arms shipments were resumed on June 27, and on July 3 a first contingent of 250 Zairians arrived to strengthen Habré; the United States announced in July military and food aid for 10 million dollars. Gaddafi suffered also a diplomatic setback from the OAU, that at the meeting held in June officially recognized Habré's government and asked for all foreign troops to leave Chad.

Supplied by Americans, Zairians and the French, Habré rapidly reorganized his forces (now called Chadian National Armed Forces or FANT) and marched north to confront the GUNT and the Libyans, that he met south of Abéché. Habré proved again his ability, crushing Goukouni's forces, and started a vast counteroffensive that enabled him to retake in rapid succession Abéché, Biltine, Fada and, on July 30, Faya-Largeau, threatening to attack the Tibesti and the Aouzou Strip.

Opération Manta

Artikel utama: Opération Manta

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A map of Chad including the 15th parallel (the Red Line) where the French separated government and rebel forces

Feeling that a complete destruction of the GUNT would be an intolerable blow for his prestige, and fearing that Habré would provide support for all opposition to Gaddafi, the Colonel called for a Libyan intervention in force, as his Chadian allies could not secure a definitive victory without Libyan armor and airpower.

Since the day after the fall of the town, Faya-Largeau was subjected to a sustained air bombardment, using Su-22 and Mirage F-1s from the Aouzou air base, along with Tu-22 bombers from Sebha. Within ten days, a large ground force had been assembled east and west of Faya-Largeau by first ferrying men, armor, and artillery by air to Sabha, Al Kufrah, and the Aouzou airfield, and then by shorter range transport planes to the area of conflict. The fresh Libyan forces amounted to 11,000 mostly regular troops, and eighty combat aircraft participated to the offensive; nowithstanding this, the Libyans maintained their traditional role of providing fire support, and occasional tank charges, for the assaults of the GUNT, that could count on 3,000–4,000 men on this occasion.

The GUNT-Libyan alliance invested on August 10 the Faya-Largeau oasis, where Habré had entrenched himself with about 5,000 troops. Battered by MRL, artillery and tank fire and continuous airstrikes, the FANT's defensive line disintegrated when the GUNT launched the final assault, leaving 700 FANT troops on the ground. Habré escaped with the remnants of his army to the capital, without being pursued by the Libyans.

This was to prove a tactical blunder, as the new Libyan intervention had alarmed France, that, also due to American and African pressures, announced on August 6 the return of French troops in Chad as part of Opération Manta, meant to stop the GUNT-Libyan advance and more generally weaken Gaddafi's influence in the internal affairs of Chad. Three days later several hundred French troops were dispatched to N'Djamena from the Central African Republic, that were later brought to 2,700, with several squadron of Jaguar fighter-bombers. This made it the largest expeditionary force ever assembled by the French in Africa, except for the Algerian War of Independence.

The French government then defined a limit (the so-called Red Line), along the 15th parallel, extending from Mao to Abéché, and warned that they would not tolerate any incursion south of this line by Lybian or GUNT forces. Both the Libyans and the French remained on their side of the line, with France showing itself unwilling to help Habré retake the north, while the Libyans avoided starting a conflict with France by attacking the line. This led to a de facto division of the country, with Libya maintaining control of all the territory north of the Red Line.

A lull ensued, during which in November talks sponsored by the OAU failed to conciliate the opposing Chadian factions; no more successful was Ethiopia's leader Mengistu's attempt at the beginning of 1984. Mengistu's failure was followed on January 24 by a GUNT attack, supported by heavy Libyan armor, on the FANT outpost of Ziguey, a move mainly meant to persuade France and the African states to reopen negotiations. France reacted to this breach of the Red Line by launching the first significant air counter-attack, bringing into Chad new troops and unilaterally rising the defensive line to the 16th parallel.

French withdrawal

To put an end to the deadlock, Gaddafi proposed on April 30 a mutual withdrawal of both the French and Libyan forces in Chad. The French President François Mitterrand showed himself receptive to the offer, and on September 17 the two leaders publicly announced that the mutual withdrawal would start on September 25, and be completed by November 10. The accord was at first hailed by the media as a proof attesting Mitterrand's diplomatic skills and a decisive progress towards the solution of the Chadian crisis; it also answered Mitterrand's intent of following regards Libya and Chad a foreign policy independent from both the United States and the Chadian government.

While France respected the deadline, the Libyans limited themselves to retiring some forces, while maintaining at least 3,000 men stationed in Northern Chad. When this became evident, it resulted in a source of considerable embarrassment for the French and the occasion of recriminations between the French and Chadian governments.

According to Nolutshungu, the 1984 bilateral Franco-Libyan agreement, may have provided Gaddafi with an excellent opportunity to find an exit from the Chadian quagmire, while bolstering his international prestige and posing him in a condition to force Habré into accepting a peace accord which would have included Libya's proxies. Instead, Gaddafi misread France withdrawal as a willingness to accept Libya's military presence in Chad and the de facto annexation of the whole BET by Libya, an action that was certain to meet the opposition of all Chadian factions and of the OAU and the UN. Gaddafi's blunder would eventually bring about his defeat, with the rebellion against him of the GUNT and a new French expedition in 1986.

Opérasi Épervier

Artikel utama: Opérasi Epervier

Selama periode antara tahun 1984 dan tahun 1986, in which no major clash took place, Habré greatly strengthened his position thanks to staunch US support and Libya's failure to respect the Franco-Libyan 1984 agreement. Decisive was also the increasing factional bickering that started plaguing the GUNT since 1984, centered around the fight between Goukouni and Acheikh ibn Oumar over the leadership of the organization.

In this period Gaddafi expanded his control over northern Chad, building new roads and erecting a major new airbase, Ouadi Doum, meant to better support air and ground operations beyond the Aouzou Strip, and brought in considerable reinforcements in 1985, rising their forces in the country to 7,000 troops, 300 tanks and 60 combat aircraft. While this build-up took place, significant elements of the GUNT passed over to the Habré government, as part of the latter's policy of accommodation.

These desertions alarmed Gaddafi, as the GUNT provided a cover of legitimacy to Libya's presence in Chad. To put a halt to these and reunite the GUNT, a major offensive was launched on the Red Line, whose ultimate goal was N'Djamena itsef. The attack, started on February 10, involved 5,000 Libyan and 5,000 GUNT troops, and concentrated on the FANT outposts of Kouba Olanga, Kalait and Oum Chalouba. The campaign ended in disaster for Gaddafi, when a FANT counteroffensive on February 13 using the new equipment obtained from the French forced the attackers to withdraw and reorganize.

Most important was French reaction to the attack. Gaddafi had possibly believed that, due to the incoming French legislative elections, Mitterrand would have been reluctant to start a new risky and costly expedition to save Habré; this evaluation proved wrong, as what the French President could not politically risk was to show weakness towards Libyan aggression. As a result, on February 14 Opération Epervier was started, bringing 1,200 French troops and several squadrons of Jaguars in Chad. Two days later, to send a clear message to Gaddafi, the French Air Force bombed Libya's Ouadi Doum airbase, which caused in retaliation the following day the Libyan bombing of the N'Djamena Airport.

Tibesti War

The defeats suffered in February and March accelerated the disintegration of the GUNT. When in March at a new round of OAU-sponsored talks held in Congo Goukouni failed to appear, many suspected the hand of Libya, causing the defection from the GUNT of its Vice-president Kamougué, followed by the First Army and the FROLINAT Originel. In August, it was the CDR's turn to leave the coalition, seizing the town of Fada. When in October Goukouni's Angkatan Bersenjata Rakyat attempted to retake Fada, the Libyan garrison attacked Goukouni's troops, giving way to a pitched battle that effectively ended the GUNT. In the same month, Goukouni was arrested by the Libyans, while his troops rebelled against Gaddafi, dislodging the Libyans from all their positions in the Tibesti, and on October 24 went over to Habré.

To reestabilish their supply lines and retake the towns of Bardai, Zouar and Wour, the Libyans sent in Tibesti a task-force of 2,000 troops with T-62 tanks and heavy support by the Libyan Air Force. The offensive started successfully, expelling the GUNT from its key strongholds, also through the use of napalm and, allegedly, poison gas. This attack ultimately backfired, causing the prompt reaction of Habré, who sent 2,000 FANT soldiers to link with the GUNT forces. Also Mitterrand reacted forcefully, ordering a mission which parachuted fuel, food, ammunition and anti-tank missiles to the rebels, and also infiltrated military personnel. Through this action, the French made clear that they did not felt any more committed to keep south of the Red Line, and were ready to act whenever they found it necessary.

While militarily Habré was only partly successful in his attempt to evict the Libyans from the Tibesti (the Libyans would fully leave the region in March, when a series of defeats in the north-east had made the area untenable), the campaign was a great strategic breakthrough for the FANT, as it transformed a civil war into a national war against a foreign invader, stimulating a sense of national unity that had never been seen before in Chad.

Toyota War

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Habré meets Mitterrand in Paris in July 1987

Artikel utama: Toyota War

At the opening of 1987, the last year of the war, the Libyan expeditionary force was still impressive, counting on 8,000 troops and 300 tanks; but it had lost the key support of its Chadian allies, who had generally provided reconnaissance and acted as assault infantry. Without them the Libyan garrisons resembled isolated and vulnerable islands in the Chadian desert. On the other side, the FANT was greatly strengthened, now having 10,000 highly motivated troops, provided with fast-moving and sand-adapted Toyota trucks equipped with MILAN anti-tank guided missiles, that gave the name of "Toyota War" to the last phase of the Chadian-Libyan conflict.

Habré started on January 2 1987 his reconquest of northern Chad with a successful attack of the well-defended Libyan communications base of Fada. Against the Libyan army the Chadian commander Hassan Djamous conducted a series of swift pincer movements, enveloping the Libyan positions and crushing them with sudden attacks from all sides. This strategy was repeated by Djamous in March in the battles of B'ir Kora and Ouadi Doum, inflicting crushing losses and forcing Gaddafi to evacuate northern Chad.

This in turn endangered Libyan control over the Aouzou Strip, and Aouzou fell in August to the FANT, only to be repelled by an overwhelming Libyan counter-offensive and the French refusal to provide air cover to the Chadians. Habré readily replied to this setback with the first Chadian incursion in Libyan territory of the Chadian-Libyan conflict, mounting on September 5 a surprise and fully successful raid against the key Libyan air base at Maaten al-Sarra. This attack was part of a plan to remove the threat of Libyan airpower before a renewed offensive on Aouzou.

The projected attack on Aouzou never took place, as the dimensions of the victory obtained at Maaten made France fear that the attack on the Libyan Base was only the first stage of a general offensive into Libya proper, a possibility that France was not willing to tolerate. As for Gaddafi, being subjected to internal and international pressures, he showed himself more conciliatory, which brought as a result to an OAU-brokered ceasefire on September 11.

Akhir

While there were many violations of the ceasefire, the incidents were relatively minor. The two governments immediately started complex diplomatic manoeuvres to bring on their side world opinion in the case, widely expected, that the conflict was resumed; but the two parts were also careful to leave the door open for a peaceful solution. The latter course was promoted by France and most African states, while the Reagan Administration saw in a resumption of the conflict the best chance to unseat Gaddafi.

Steadily relations among the two countries bettered, with Gaddafi giving signs that he wanted to normalize relations with the Chadian government, to the point of recognizing that the war had been an error. In May 1988 the Libyan leader declared he would recognize Habré as the legitimate president of Chad "as a gift to Africa"; this led on October 3 to the resumption of full diplomatic relations between the two countries. The following year, on August 31 1989, Chadian and Libyan representatives met in Algiers to negotiate the Framework Agreement on the Peaceful Settlement of the Territorial Dispute, by which Gaddafi agreed to discuss with Habré the Aouzou Strip and to bring the issue to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for a binding ruling if bilateral talks failed. Therefore, after a year of inconclusive talks, the sides submitted in September 1990 the dispute to the ICJ.

Chadian-Libyan relations were further ameliorated when Libyan-supported Idriss Déby unseated Habré on December 2. Gaddafi was the first head of state to recognize the new regime, and he also signed treaties of friendship and cooperation on various levels; but regarding the Aouzou Strip Déby followed his predecessor, declaring that if necessary he would fight to keep the strip out of Libya's hands.

The Aouzou dispute was concluded for good on February 3 1994 when the judges of the ICJ by a majority of 16 to 1 deliberated that the Aouzou Strip belonged to Chad. The court's judgement was implemented without delay, the two parties signing as early as April 4 an agreement concerning the practical modalities for the implementation of the judgement. Monitored by international observers, the withdrawal of Libyan troops from the Strip began on April 15 and was completed by May 10. The formal and final transfer of the Strip from Libya to Chad took place on May 30, when the sides signed a joint declaration stating that the Libyan withdrawal had been effected.

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