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Al-Masjid an-Nabawi di Madinah, Arab Saudi, tempat Nabi Muhammad, Khalifah Abu Bakar dan Khalifah Omar dimakamkan, adalah salah satu situs tersuci dalam Islam Sunni .

Anti-Sunni adalah gerakan kebencian, prasangka, diskriminasi, persekusi, dan kekerasan terhadap Muslim Sunni .[1]

Sebagai kata lain dari "Sunnifobia", yaitu "Ketakutan atau kebencian terhadap aliran dan penganut Sunni".[2]

Label "Wahabi" telah sering dipakai untuk menjelekkan Muslim Salafi awam.[3]

Retorika Perang melawan Teror [ War on Terror = WoT ]

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Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab adalah tokoh pembaruan Muslim Sunni di Jazirah Arab abad ke-18.[4] Ulama Ottoman menganggap syaikh Muhammad dan kelompoknya sebagai kelompok bidah dan murtad.[5] Dilabeli dengan istilah Wahabi . Selama abad ke-19, penjajah Inggris di India mendakwa para sarjana pejuang Sunni dalam "Pengadilan Wahabi Luarbiasa" untuk menekan perkembangan Islam yang mereka sebut "konspirasi Wahabi".[6] [7]

Secara resmi, menjadi seorang Wahabi adalah ilegal di Rusia.[8] [9] Di Asia Tengah yang beraliansi dengan Rusia, istilah "Wahabi" sering digunakan untuk merujuk pada kegiatan agama ilegal dan melawan negara. Akibatnya, setiap Muslim Sunni, baik modernis, konservatif, politis maupun apolitis, terdampak aturan ini dan harus membatasi kegiatan keagamaan mereka.[10]

Terkait peristiwa 9/11 WTC, AS dan kelompoknya meluncurkan kebijakan kontroversial dari upaya melawan-teroris skala besar dikenal dengan Perang Melawan Teror.[11] Kebijakan ini ditandai retorika terkenal "Anda bersama kami atau Anda melawan kami".[12] Baik pendekatan ini, maupun tujuan WoT amat dipertanyakan.[13] [14] Kebijakan ini juga dituduh menghasut berbagai bentuk Islamofobia dalam skala meluas.[15] [16]

Retorika istilah "WoT " ini telah diadopsi rezim negara otoriter lainnya.[17] Israel, Rusia, China, dan negara lainnya, sering menggunakan label "Wahabi" untuk menarget Muslim Sunni.[18] [19] [20] Rusia menggunakan "WoT " dalam Perang Chechnya Ke-2, dalam pemberontakan di Kaukasus Utara, dan pada intervensi Rusia - Perang Saudara di Suriah .[21]

Retorika WoT juga dijadikan senjata oleh penguasa Shiite Iran[22][23] dilihami oleh Khomeinism, bahkan sering bekerja sama dengan AS.[24] Pejabat Iran biasanya menggunakan label "Wahabi" untuk menyudutkan lawan-lawan mereka pada isu ini.[25] Bahkan terkait WoT, pemimpin Iran sepertiAyatollah Khomeini danRafsanjani telah menggunakan label Wahhabi yang menggambarkan Sunni sebagai "sesat" untuk membangkitkan Sunnifobia dan kebijakan Iran untuk menyebarluaskannya pada Revolusi Iran.[26][27] Kurikulum pendidikan Khomeinis di Iran dikenal karena kekejaman sektarian mereka terhadap Muslim Sunni, sering menggambarkan Sunni dan ulama bersejarah Sunni sebagai "Wahhabi".[28]

Omair Anas berpendapat bahwa setelah WoT, 'Teori Konspirasi Wahabi' menggantikan posisi AS sebagai musuh utama Iran.[29] Senada, Qassem Soleimani, mantan Ketua IRGC yaitu Garda Revolusi Iran, mengatakan bahwa Wahabi berasal dari Yahudi.[30][31] Hassan Nasrallah, sekjen Hezbollah menuduh 'Wahhabisme' sebagai 'Lebih iblis dari Israel'.[32] Menlu Iran tahun 2016 Javad Zarif menulis artikel diThe New York Times berjudul "Let Us Rid the World of Wahhabism", dimana dia mendeskripsi wahabi sebagai 'Penyimpangan Agama' dan 'Kelompok pemuja kematian' yang telah "menimbulkan malapetaka", dan berpendapat bahwa "hampir setiap kelompok teroris yang merusak nama Islam" diilhami oleh Wahhabisme.[33][34][35]

Persekusi di Masa Lalu

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Periode Safawi

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Sebagai tanggapan terhadap pertumbuhan Islam Sunni, Dinasti Safawi membunuh banyak Sunni, berusaha mengubah mereka menjadi Syiah, banyak pemakaman orang-orang suci Sunni dihancurkan atas perintah shah Safawi, negara-negara Sunni juga dikuasai.[36][37] Mereka juga mengutuk tiga khalifah pertama Muslim Sunni, dan juga Aisha dan Hafsa, putri dari dua khalifah pertama dan istri Rasulullah.[38][39]


Ismail I membuat undang-undang baru untuk Iran dan tanah yang dia kuasai:

  • Memaksakan Syi'ah sebagai negara dan agama wajib bagi seluruh bangsa dan banyak pemaksaan konversi Sunni Sufi Iran ke Syi'ah.[40] [41] [42]
  • Dia memperkenalkan kembali Sadr (bahasa Arab, pemimpin) – sebuah jabatan yang bertanggung jawab untuk mengawasi lembaga dan wakaf keagamaan. Dengan maksud untuk mengubah Iran menjadi negara Syiah, Sadr juga diberi tugas menyebarkan doktrin Dua Belas.[43]
  • Dia menghancurkan masjid Sunni. Hal ini bahkan dicatat oleh Tomé Pires, duta besar Portugis untuk Cina yang mengunjungi Iran pada tahun 1511–12, yang merujuk pada Ismail mencatat: "Dia (yaitu Ismail) mereformasi gereja-gereja kita, menghancurkan rumah semua orang Moor yang mengikuti ( Sunnah ) Muhammad. . ." [44]
  • Dia menegakkan ritual dan kutukan wajib dari tiga Khalifah Sunni pertama ( Abu Bakar, Umar, dan Utsman ) sebagai perampas, dari semua masjid, membubarkan Thariqah Sunni dan menyita aset mereka, menggunakan perlindungan negara untuk mengembangkan tempat suci, institusi, dan seni keagamaan Syiah dan mendatangkan ulama Syiah untuk menggantikan ulama Sunni.[45] [46] [47]
  • Dia membunuh Sunni dan menghancurkan serta menodai kuburan dan masjid mereka. Hal ini menyebabkan Ottoman Sultan Bayezid II (yang awalnya memberi selamat kepada Ismail atas kemenangannya) untuk menasihati dan meminta raja muda (dengan cara "kebapakan") untuk menghentikan tindakan anti-Sunni. Namun, Ismail sangat anti-Sunni, mengabaikan peringatan Sultan, dan terus menyebarkan keyakinan Syiah dengan pedang.[48] [49]
  • Dia menganiaya, memenjarakan, mengasingkan, dan mengeksekusi kaum Sunni yang melawan dengan keras kepala.[50] [51]
  • Dengan berdirinya pemerintahan Safawi, ada hari libur yang sangat riuh dan penuh warna, hampir seperti karnaval pada tanggal 26 Dhu al-Hijjah (atau alternatifnya, 9 Rabi' al-awwal ) merayakan pembunuhan Khalifah Omer. Puncak acara hari itu adalah membuat patung Umar dimaki, dihina, dan akhirnya dibakar. Namun, seiring dengan membaiknya hubungan antara Iran dan negara-negara Sunni, hari raya tersebut tidak lagi dilaksanakan (setidaknya secara resmi).[52]
  • Pada tahun 1501, Ismail mengundang semua Syiah yang tinggal di luar Iran untuk datang ke Iran dan mendapatkan jaminan perlindungan dari mayoritas Sunni.[53]

Persekusi di Zaman Modern

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Irak

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Artikel utama: Sunni Islam in Iraq

Pemerintah Irak yang dibentuk setelah invasi Irak tahun 2003 bertanggung jawab atas diskriminasi sistematis terhadap Muslim Sunni dalam birokrasi, politik, militer, polisi, serta dugaan pembantaian tahanan Muslim Sunni secara sektarian.[54] Kebijakan De-Ba'athifikasi yang diterapkan setelah penggulingan rezim Baath sebagian besar menyasar pegawai negeri, politisi, dan pejabat militer Sunni; menyebabkan diskriminasi anti-Sunni dalam birokrasi dan memburuknya situasi sektarian di Irak .[55] Banyak Sunni terbunuh setelah pemboman masjid al-Askari tahun 2006 selama Perang Saudara Irak .

Organisasi internasional seperti Human Rights Watch mengutuk pemerintah Irak dan kelompok militan yang didukung Iran melakukan pembantaian sektarian terhadap minoritas Sunni di Irak, menyatakan bahwa kekejaman ini merupakan " kejahatan terhadap kemanusiaan ".[56]

Pembantaian Barwana

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Artikel utama: Barwana massacre

Pembantaian itu diduga dilakukan oleh militan Syiah, sebagai balas dendam atas kekejaman ISIS, di desa Sunni Barwana, yang diduga menewaskan 70 anak laki-laki dan laki-laki.[57]

Pembantaian Hay al Jihad

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Artikel utama: Hay al Jihad massacre

Pada 9 Juli 2006, di daerah Hay al-Jihad di Baghdad, ibu kota Irak, diperkirakan 40 warga sipil Sunni tewas dalam serangan balas dendam yang dilakukan oleh militan Syiah dari Tentara Mahdi .[58]

Pembantaian Masjid Musab bin Umair

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Artikel utama: Musab bin Umair mosque massacre

Pada tanggal 22 Agustus 2014, militan Syiah menewaskan sedikitnya 73 orang dalam serangan terhadap masjid Sunni Mus`ab ibn `Umair di desa Imam Wais di Irak, serangan itu terjadi selama sholat Jumat, di mana banyak Sunni menghadiri sholat mereka. . [59] Saat penyerangan, ada sekitar 150 jemaah di masjid tersebut. Kelompok militan Asaib Ahl al-Haq yang didukung Iran, kelompok sempalan Tentara Mahdi, diduga sebagai pelakunya.[60] [61]

Iran

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Sejak Revolusi Iran 1979, minoritas Sunni di Iran pada dasarnya telah diperlakukan sebagai warga negara kelas dua melalui kebijakan sektarian oleh pemerintah Khomeinis Iran. Provinsi-provinsi mayoritas Sunni diabaikan oleh pemerintah, yang menyebabkan ketidaksesuaian sosial-ekonomi dan tingkat kemiskinan yang tinggi.[62] [63] [64] Pemimpin Tertinggi pertama Iran Khomeini memiliki pandangan agama yang sangat anti-Sunni, yang juga tercermin dalam strategi geo-politik yang dia uraikan dalam " Kehendak dan Perjanjian Terakhir " -nya.[65] Selama peristiwa Revolusi 1979, kota-kota mayoritas Sunni di provinsi Khuzestan, Azerbaijan Barat, dan Golestan menjadi sasaran serangan sektarian oleh militan Khomein. Banyak pemimpin agama dan cendekiawan Sunni yang awalnya mendukung revolusi dipenjarakan oleh Khomeini selama tahun 1980-an.[66]

Diskriminasi politik sejak itu telah dinormalisasi, dengan Sunni ditolak mewakili badan-badan pemerintah seperti Dewan Wali, Majelis Ahli dan Dewan Kemanfaatan yang disediakan untuk Syiah. Sunni juga terpinggirkan oleh Majlis Iran, dengan kurang dari 6% kursi yang diizinkan untuk Sunni sejak pembentukan badan parlemen pada tahun 1980.[67] [68]

Setelah kematian Khomeini pada tahun 1989, rezim Iran mulai secara terbuka mengekspor retorika Anti-Sunni melalui propaganda dan saluran media Khomeinis di seluruh Dunia Islam, dalam proporsi yang meningkat terutama sejak tahun 2000-an.[69] Selain menganiaya Sunni di luar negeri, Sunni di Iran juga mengalami diskriminasi sistematis oleh pemerintah. Etnis minoritas yang mayoritas Sunni; seperti Kurdi, Baloch, Turkmens dan Arab menderita beban penganiayaan agama; dan banyak Masjid (masjid) komunitas ini secara rutin dihancurkan oleh pasukan keamanan. Terlepas dari kehadiran 10 juta penduduk Sunni di Teheran, rezim juga melarang keberadaan masjid Sunni di kota tersebut, yang menyebabkan ketidakpuasan yang meluas. Banyak Imam Sunni independen dari rezim telah dibunuh oleh regu kematian Khomeinis .[70] Pada tahun 2007, pemerintah memperketat pembatasan sekolah dan universitas agama Sunni; dan telah memaksa Sunni tullab (pelajar agama) untuk belajar di institut Khomein.[71]

Sunni semakin didiskriminasi melalui teror negara dan kebijakan sektarian yang semakin meningkat dari Presiden Ibrahim Raisi sejak 2021.[72] Dalam pembantaian brutal yang dikenal sebagai "Jumat Berdarah" yang dilakukan pada September 2022, pasukan IRGC dan Basij melepaskan tembakan dan membunuh lebih dari 90 jamaah Sunni selama sholat Jum'at di Masjid Jameh Makki di Sistan-Balochistan, masjid Sunni terbesar di Iran. Per Oktober 2022, pembantaian tersebut adalah insiden paling mematikan yang terjadi sebagai bagian dari tindakan militer terhadap protes Iran tahun 2022 . Molwi Abdolhamid Ismaeelzahi, cendekiawan Islam Baloch yang populer dan pemimpin spiritual minoritas Muslim Sunni Iran, yang memimpin doa mengecam rezim atas pembantaian tersebut dan "kebohongan mutlak" yang menstereotipkan jamaah Sunni reguler sebagai separatis Baloch.[73] [74] [75] Dalam pidato yang tidak biasa mengutuk Ali Khamenei dan tentara Iran atas kekerasan dan pertumpahan darah, Abdul Hamid menyatakan:

“ Pemimpin tertinggi Republik Islam, sebagai panglima angkatan bersenjata, serta pejabat lainnya semuanya bertanggung jawab, dan tidak ada yang bisa mengelak dari tanggung jawab ini. ." [76]

Amerika Serikat

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Pembantaian Muslim Hanafi 1973

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Artikel utama: 1973 Hanafi Muslim massacre

Pembantaian Muslim Hanafi tahun 1973 terjadi pada sore hari tanggal 18 Januari 1973, ketika dua orang dewasa dan seorang anak ditembak mati. Empat anak lainnya yang berusia antara sembilan dan sepuluh tahun tenggelam. Dua lainnya luka parah. Pembunuhan terjadi di sebuah rumah yang alamatnya adalah 7700 16th Street NW, Washington, DC, yang dibeli oleh sekelompok Muslim Hanafi dan diberi nama "Hanafi American Muslim Rifle and Pistol Club". [77] [78] [79]

Lihat juga

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Referensi

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  1. ^ John Richard Thackrah (5 September 2013). Dictionary of Terrorism (edisi ke-2, revised). Routledge. hlm. 252. ISBN 978-1-135-16595-6. 
  2. ^ "Meaning of Sunniphobia". Words Look. 
  3. ^ "The Wahhabi Myth: Debunking the Bogeyman". Muslim Matters. April 1, 2007. Diarsipkan dari versi asli tanggal 29 November 2020. 
  4. ^ "Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, Muhammad (d. 1791)". Oxford Islamic Studies online. Diarsipkan dari versi asli tanggal 12 July 2016. 
  5. ^ SAUDI ARABIA WAHHÂBÎSM & THE SALAFÎ SECT: UNDERSTANDING THE GREAT CONSPIRACY. Johannesburg, South Africa: Dar al Ahnaf. hlm. 81. "Shaykh Muhammad Ibn Sulaymân al-Madanî ash-Shâfi‘î, as quoted in the book ‘Ashadd ul-Jihâd’, declared his belief a heresy and formally excommunicated him by issuing a fatwâ, the text of which said: “ This man is leading the ignoramuses of the present age to a heretical path. He is attempting to extinguish Allah's light, but Allah will not permit His light to be extinguished.” 
  6. ^ Stephens, Julia (January 5, 2009). "The "Great Wahabi Trial": The Legal Construction and Deconstruction of the Muslim Jihadi in British India, 1869–71". American Historical Association. Diarsipkan dari versi asli tanggal 5 October 2020. 
  7. ^ Stephens, Julia (January 2013). "The Phantom Wahhabi: Liberalism and the Muslim fanatic in mid-Victorian India". Modern Asian Studies. 47 (1): 22–52. doi:10.1017/S0026749X12000649. JSTOR 23359778. ABSTRACT In the late 1860s and early 1870s the British colonial government in India suppressed an imagined Wahhabi conspiracy, which it portrayed as a profound threat to imperial security. 
  8. ^ "Совет муфтиев России выступил против запрета ваххабизма". 2 April 2018. Diarsipkan dari versi asli tanggal 5 April 2018. 
  9. ^ "Attack on Wahhabi Islam divides Russian Muslims: COUNCIL OF MUFTIS OF RUSSIA SPEAKS OUT AGAINST BAN OF WAHHABISM - "While deeply aware of the vital importance of combating the ideology of intolerance and devoting great efforts in this direction, we nevertheless consider that the introduction of the principle of prosecution of believers for their convictions and not for specific illegal actions will have a most harmful effect both on the Muslim community of Russia and inter-ethnic harmony and on the legal culture of the Russia state," the statement of the Council of Muftis says, which was posted on Monday on its website". stetson.edu. Diarsipkan dari versi asli tanggal 26 January 2021. 
  10. ^ Commins, David (2006). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. London, New York: I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd. hlm. 192. In Russia and Central Asia, public figures and the media see Wahhabism as the inspiration for religious revival and Islamic political movements. During the Soviet era, official apprehensions emerged about an ‘Islamic threat’ posed by Sufi orders as nests of secret conspiracies against the communist system. In the post-Soviet era, Sufism has assumed a positive connotation as a moderate form of Islam opposed to Wahhabism, which has become a sort of bogeyman in public discourse. Pejorative use of the term cropped up in the late Soviet era, when members of the official religious establishment castigated proponents of expunging ritual of non-scriptural elements for ‘importing’ Wahhabism, thus implying that it is alien to the region’s heritage. Many Russians believe that after the Afghan war, Wahhabis infiltrated Central Asia to spread their version of Islam. Thus, in 1998, political leaders of Russia, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan declared their readiness to confront ‘a threat of aggressive fundamentalism, aggressive extremism and above all Wahhabism. This is what we have currently in Afghanistan and in troubled Tajikistan.’ The government of Uzbekistan tags unsanctioned religious activity with the Wahhabi label. The problem with this outlook is that it conflates differences among a variety of Muslim religious movements, which include militant and reformist political tendencies alongside utterly apolitical ones. Thus, a leading Tajik modernist who favours a blend of democracy and Islam has been branded a Wahhabi even though he has ties to Sufi circles 
  11. ^ H. Daddler, M Lindsay, Ivo, James (Dec 1, 2001). "Nasty, Brutish and Long: America's War on Terrorism". BROOKINGS. Diarsipkan dari versi asli tanggal 19 November 2020. 
  12. ^ "'You are either with us or against us'". CNN. November 6, 2001. Diarsipkan dari versi asli tanggal 24 January 2016. 
  13. ^ Odom, William (27 February 2014). "American Hegemony: How to Use It, How to Lose It" (PDF). Diarsipkan dari versi asli (PDF) tanggal 21 January 2016. 
  14. ^ K Albright, Madeleine (June 2, 2009). "Obama's Muslim Speech "According to Muslim speakers at such events, one fact stands out: When the cold war ended, America needed an enemy to replace Communism and chose Islam...Mr. Obama's dilemma is that no speech, however eloquent, can disentangle U.S.-Muslim relations from the treacherous terrain of current events in places such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and the Middle East...Muslims desire respect and respect demands frankness. We cannot pretend that American soldiers and aircraft are not attacking Muslims."". The New York Times. Diarsipkan dari versi asli tanggal 19 July 2016. 
  15. ^ A. Beydoun, Khalid (2020). "Exporting Islamophobia in the Global "War On Terror"" (PDF). NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW ONLINE. Diarsipkan dari versi asli (PDF) tanggal 26 April 2020. 
  16. ^ Carrington, Kerry; Ball, Matthew; O'Brien, Erin; Tall, Juan (2013). Crime, Justice and Social Democracy: International Perspectives. UK: PALGRAVE MACMILLAN. hlm. 133–144. doi:10.1057/9781137008695_9. ISBN 978-1-137-00868-8. Diarsipkan dari versi asli tanggal 27 March 2020. When, in September 2001, the right-wing Republican president of the US proclaimed the ‘war on terrorism’, which he also dubbed a ‘crusade’, George W. Bush was soon joined in such battle by his staunch British ally Tony Blair, a Labour prime minister. A populist prime minister of the conservative coalition in Australia, John Howard faithfully entered the fray on behalf of this nation, which likewise imagines itself to have a special relationship with the USA. All these allies participated in the unlawful invasion of Afghanistan the following month, in the name of this war on terrorism, and of Iraq eighteen months later. The forces of all three countries are still in Afghanistan, with very little difference to this fact having been made by the now Democratic presidency in the US, the now Tory-led coalition in the UK, or the now Labor government in Australia. Really, existing labour parties - when in government, that is - have taken a very similar stance in relation to securing militarily the US-led global empire to that of their conservative opponents. All have participated similarly in state crime in the ‘war on terror’; indeed all have been comparably complicit in what I call ‘empire crime’ 
  17. ^ A Beydoun, Khaled (2020). "EXPORTING ISLAMOPHOBIA IN THE GLOBAL "WAR ON TERROR"". New York University Law Review Online. 95:81: 84. Beyond genuine national security threats, countries across the world capitalized on the conflation of Islam with terrorism to serve discrete national interests. This American War on Terror furnished nations with license, and more importantly, a policing template and language to profile and persecute their Muslim minority populations. American Islamophobia, buoyed by swift state action including the War in Afghanistan and the USA PATRIOT Act, manifested in a surge of vigilante violence against Muslims and “Muslim-looking” groups and had global impact 
  18. ^ Delong-Bas, Natana J. (2004). Wahhabi Islam:From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad. New York: OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS. hlm. 123–124. ISBN 0199883548. Many of the regimes and movements labeled as Wahhabi in the contemporary era do not necessarily share the same theological and legal orientations. The reality is that Wahhabism has become such a blanket term for any Islamic movement that has an apparent tendency toward misogyny, militantism, extremism, or strict and literal interpretation of the Quran and hadith that the designation of a regime or movement as Wahhabi or Wahhabi-like tells us little about its actual nature. Furthermore, these contemporary interpretations of Wahhabism do not nec- essarily reflect the writings or teachings of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab 
  19. ^ Atkin, Muriel. "THE RHETORIC OF ISLAMOPHOBIA". CA&C Press AB. In political, as well as religious matters, any Muslim who challenges the status quo is at risk of being labeled a Wahhabi. This is how the KGB and its post-Soviet successors have used the term. In fact, the KGB may have played a large role in promoting its use 
  20. ^ Commins, David (2006). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. London: I.B TAURIS. hlm. 192. Pejorative use of the term cropped up in the late Soviet era, when members of the official religious establishment castigated proponents of expunging ritual of non-scriptural elements for ‘importing’ Wahhabism, thus implying that it is alien to the region’s heritage.Many Russians believe that after the Afghan war, Wahhabis infiltrated Central Asia to spread their version of Islam. Thus, in 1998, political leaders of Russia, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan declared their readiness to confront ‘a threat of aggressive fundamentalism, aggressive extremism and above all Wahhabism. This is what we have currently in Afghanistan and in troubled Tajikistan. The government of Uzbekistan tags unsanctioned religious activity with the Wahhabi label. The problem with this outlook is that it conflates differences among a variety of Muslim religious movements, which include militant and reformist political tendencies alongside utterly apolitical ones. Thus, a leading Tajik modernist who favours a blend of democracy and Islam has been branded a Wahhabi even though he has ties to Sufi circles. 
  21. ^ Shuster, Simon (2011-09-19). "Breaking News, Analysis, Politics, Blogs, News Photos, Video, Tech Reviews". Time (dalam bahasa Inggris). ISSN 0040-781X. Diakses tanggal 2023-05-25. 
  22. ^ Zammit, Wael (30 August 2015). "US–Iran "Special" Relations Between 2001 and 2003: Friends or Foes? "The "war on terror" created a rare opportunity for Iran and U.S. to come together." E-International Relations. hlm. 14. Diarsipkan dari versi asli tanggal 20 April 2017. In one of their meetings, the member of the Iranian delegation had a message for the American government: “Iran was prepared to work unconditionally with the United States in the “war on terror” and if they could work with [the Americans] on this issue, it had the potential to fundamentally transform U.S.-Iranian relations.” Commenting on this, reporter John Richardson said that such a statement had “seismic diplomatic implications" ... " In Tehran, the Iranians opted for rapprochement as they wanted to ensure that the U.S. military campaign in Afghanistan could succeed, and they had their own reasons. In fact, the American decision to destroy the infrastructure of al-Qaeda and topple the Taliban served major political, economic and strategic goals for Tehran" .. "To eliminate the Taliban regime would also mean to put an end to the support the Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK) received from Iran’s enemies and neighbors: Afghanistan and Sadam’s Iraq. Last but not least, Iran wanted to play an active role in the “war on terror;” reduce tension and improve relations with Western countries including the United States and assure Tehran’s full integration in the international community." Pg.15 "The “war on terror” created a rare opportunity for Iran and U.S. to come together. Hilary Mann,who had just joined the National Security Council staff as its resident Iran expert and Ryan Crocker, a senior State Department official, sit with Iranian officials who expressed their will to cooperate with the Americans and re-establish diplomatic relations." Pg.16 "I an interview with Barbara Slavin in 2005, former Iran Revolutionary Guards Corps’ chief commander, Mohsen Rezaie, stated that the Islamic Republic played an “important role” in capturing Kabul as members of IRGC “fought alongside and advised the Afghan rebels who helped U.S. forces topple Afghanistan’s Taliban regime” in the months after the September 11 terrorist attacks. Such a stance is further emphasized by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld who discussed the war on Afghanistan on CBS in November 11, 2001, two days before the fall of Kabul and asserted that “there [were] some Iranian liaison people, as well as some American liaison people working with the same Afghan forces.” Besides, Slavin confirms the Iranian role and argues that members of the IRG Qods Brigade were on the field when the Alliance, with U.S. air support, took control of Kabul."... "The American-Iranian cooperation did not end after the successful overthrow of the Taliban regime. The rapprochement between the two arch-foes was further illustrated in their collaboration to create an interim post-Taliban government in Afghanistan. Whereas, Iran’s role in the “war on terror” was largely secret, its role in forming a “broad-based, multiethnic, politically balanced, freely chosen” government was rather direct as the American and Iranian diplomats met and collaborated via the Six plus Two group. 
  23. ^ Sebnem Oruc, Merve (25 February 2020). "How did the world buy Assad's 'war on terror' narrative?". Daily Sabah. hlm. While the Assad regime and its most loyal backer Iran provided an opportunity for the rise of al-Qaida and Daesh in Syria, Damascus also allowed the radicals to travel abroad freely to confuse the Westerners. The extremists went abroad and recruited sympathizers, brought them to Syria for training and then sent them back. Assad’s clerics had already threatened the West; they kept their promise and made Daesh bombings happen in the Western countries. It was a “shock and awe” tactic that actually worked. The Western leaders who were against Assad’s rule became the targets of far-right and leftist political groups in Europe. And finally, Islamophobia – Sunniphobia is the right word actually – started to rise in the West as every Sunni was seen as a threat by the white supremacists and their circles of influence. 
  24. ^ N. Katz, Mark. "Iran and the "War on Terror"". Middle East Policy Council. 
  25. ^ Ostovar, Afshon (30 November 2016). "Sectarian Dilemmas in Iranian Foreign Policy: When Strategy and Identity Politics Collide". Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Diarsipkan dari versi asli tanggal 25 April 2018. However, by equating takfirism and Wahhabism, Iran further muddies the water of identity politics. It is a way of confusing the sectarian dynamic in Iraq and Syria, by asserting that the other side is not actually Sunni, but rather an extreme ideological movement (takfirism) that is beyond the pale of Islam and, therefore, not even Islamic. Like the case of the Saudi grand mufti, such rhetoric allows Iranian officials to indulge in their own game of takfir—articulating who is and who is not a Muslim and justifying actions accordingly. To neutral observers of Wahhabism, such accusations might touch on truth, but as a foreign policy tool, they only beget further acrimony from Iran’s Sunni neighbors. 
  26. ^ Kramer, Martin. "Khomeini's Messengers in Mecca". MartinKramer.org. Khomeini declared that the Saudi rulers, “these vile and ungodly Wahhabis, are like daggers which have always pierced the heart of the Muslims from the back,” and announced that Mecca was in the hands of “a band of heretics.”32 Once more, the Saudis were transformed into what the speaker of the parliament, Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, called “Wahhabi hooligans.” Rafsanjani recalled the nineteenth-century Wahhabi massacres (of Shi‘ites) in Najaf and Karbala, the Wahhabi destruction of Islamic monuments in Medina (venerated by Shi‘ites), and the Wahhabi burning of libraries (containing Shi‘ite works). The Wahhabis “will commit any kind of crime. I ask you to pay more attention to the history of that evil clique so that you can see what kind of creatures they have been in the course of their history.”33 This represented a deliberate attempt to fuel a present crisis with the memory of past sectarian hatreds." 
  27. ^ Rabinovich, Itamar; Shaked, Haim, ed. (1989). Middle East Contemporary Survey. XI 1987. Boulder, San Francisco, London: Westview Press. hlm. 174. ISBN 0-8133-0925-5. Iranian statements pandered to the belief still held by Shi‘ites that the fanatic Saudis were driven by their own misguided beliefs to kill innocent Shi‘ite pilgrims. Khomeini declared that the Saudi rulers, “these vile and ungodly Wahhabis, are like daggers which have always pierced the heart of the Muslims from the back,” and announced that Mecca was in the hands of “a band of heretics.” Once more, the Saudis were transformed into what the speaker of the parliament, Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, called “Wahhabi hooligans.” Rafsanjani recalled the nineteenth-century Wahhabi massacres (of Shi‘ites) in Najaf and Karbala, the Wahhabi destruction of Islamic monuments in Medina (venerated by Shi‘ites), and the Wahhabi burning of libraries (containing Shi‘ite works). The Wahhabis “will commit any kind of crime. I ask you to pay more attention to the history of that evil clique so that you can see what kind of creatures they have been in the course of their history.” This represented a deliberate attempt to fuel a present crisis with the memory of past sectarian hatreds. 
  28. ^ Luz, Anwar (28 February 2023). "How Two Months at an Iranian Seminary Changed My Life". New Lines Magazine. Diarsipkan dari versi asli tanggal 9 March 2023. 
  29. ^ Anas, Omair (September 17, 2016). "Iran's new Great Satan: Saudi Arabia and its Wahhabi ideology". FirstPost. Diarsipkan dari versi asli tanggal 21 March 2020. 
  30. ^ "Soleimani: Wahhabism Has Jewish Roots". Iran International. 23 February 2019. 
  31. ^ J. Frantzman, Seth (February 22, 2019). "IRGC General Soleimani says roots of Wahhabism are Jewish, linked to ISIS". The Jerusalem Post. 
  32. ^ Williams, Jennifer (27 September 2016). "The head of Hezbollah has found someone he hates even more than Israelis". Vox. "Hassan Nasrallah, the secretary general of a group that has been fighting Israel for decades, declared on Tuesday that “Wahhabism is more evil than Israel,” Lebanon’s Al Akhbar newspaper reported."... "In other words, things have gotten so bad that Hezbollah, Israel’s mortal enemy, now considers Wahhabis — that is, fellow Muslims — to be worse than Israel. Bear in mind, this is coming from the same man who has described Israel as “a cancerous entity and the root of all the crises and wars” and pledged that Israel’s destiny “is manifested in our motto: 'Death to Israel.’” 
  33. ^ Javad Zarif, Mohammad (13 September 2016). "Mohammad Javad Zarif: Let Us Rid the World of Wahhabism". The New York Times. Diarsipkan dari versi asli tanggal 9 November 2020. Since the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, militant Wahhabism has undergone a series of face-lifts, but underneath, the ideology remains the same — whether it’s the Taliban, the various incarnations of Al Qaeda or the so-called Islamic State, which is neither Islamic nor a state."...... "Over the past three decades, Riyadh has spent tens of billions of dollars exporting Wahhabism through thousands of mosques and madrasas across the world. From Asia to Africa, from Europe to the Americas, this theological perversion has wrought havoc. As one former extremist in Kosovo told The Times, "The Saudis completely changed Islam here with their money." Though it has attracted only a minute proportion of Muslims, Wahhabism has been devastating in its impact. Virtually every terrorist group abusing the name of Islam — from Al Qaeda and its offshoots in Syria to Boko Haram in Nigeria — has been inspired by this death cult. 
  34. ^ OSTOVAR, AFSHON PAPER Source: Getty Summary (30 November 2016). "Sectarian Dilemmas in Iranian Foreign Policy: When Strategy and Identity Politics Collide". Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Diarsipkan dari versi asli tanggal 9 August 2019. In September, the New York Times published an op-ed by Iran’s foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, entitled “Let Us Rid the World of Wahhabism.”Zarif contends that Wahhabist Islam has become a plague, unleashing terrorism and murderous tumult across the Middle East and throughout the world. He calls Wahhabism a “theological perversion” that has “wrought havoc” and had a “devastating” impact in Islamic communities. The violence committed by jihadist groups such as al-Qaeda is a direct result of “Riyadh’s persistent sponsorship of extremism,” he argues, and this violence is at the root of the current conflicts in the Middle East. He accuses Saudi Arabia of “playing the ‘Iran card’” to induce its allies to take part in the Syrian and Yemeni wars, and he concludes that “concrete action against extremism is needed.” Even though Riyadh caused the mess, Zarif “invite[s]” Saudi Arabia to be part of the solution. That gesture rings hollow given the accusatory tone of the piece. It is clearly a polemic against Iran’s neighbor and archrival, another salvo in their ongoing cold war. 
  35. ^ El-Bar, Karim (5 October 2016). "Analysts slam Iran's Zarif for blasting Wahhabism but ignoring own record". Middle East Eye. Diarsipkan dari versi asli tanggal 30 May 2020. 
  36. ^ Keita, Maghan (2002). Conceptualizing/Re-Conceptualizing Africa: The Construction of African Historical Identity. Brill. hlm. 90. ISBN 9789004124202. Diakses tanggal 29 January 2021. 
  37. ^ Iran: a short history : from Islamization to the present, By Monika Gronke, pg.90
  38. ^ Encyclopaedic Historiography of the Muslim World. NK Singh, A Samiuddin, p. 90.
  39. ^ The Cambridge illustrated history of the Islamic world. Francis Robinson, p. 72.
  40. ^ Modern Iran: roots and results of revolution]. Nikki R Keddie, Yann Richard, pp. 13, 20
  41. ^ The Encyclopedia of world history: ancient, medieval, and modern. Peter N. Stearns, William Leonard Langer, p. 360.
  42. ^ Immortal: A Military History of Iran and Its Armed Forces. Steven R Ward, pg.43
  43. ^ Iran: a short history: from Islamization to the present. Monika Gronke, p. 91.
  44. ^ The Judeo-Persian poet ‘Emrānī and his "Book of treasure": ‘Emrānī's Ganǰ… 'Emrānī, David Yeroushalmi, p. 20.
  45. ^ A new introduction to Islam. Daniel W Brown, p. 191.
  46. ^ Encyclopaedic Historiography of the Muslim World. NK Singh, A Samiuddin, p. 90.
  47. ^ The Cambridge illustrated history of the Islamic world. Francis Robinson, p. 72.
  48. ^ Immortal: A Military History of Iran and Its Armed Forces. Steven R. Ward, p. 44.
  49. ^ Iran and America: re-kindling a love lost]. Badi Badiozamani, pp. 174–5.
  50. ^ The Cambridge illustrated history of the Islamic world. Francis Robinson, p. 72.
  51. ^ Iraq: Old Land, New Nation in Conflict. William Spencer, p. 51.
  52. ^ Culture and customs of Iran. Elton L Daniel, 'Alī Akbar Mahdī, p. 185.
  53. ^ Iraq: Old Land, New Nation in Conflict. William Spencer, p. 51.
  54. ^ "Human Rights Watch says Iraq forces killed 250 Sunni prisoners". Hindustan Times. July 13, 2014. 
  55. ^ Harris, William (2018). "Glossary". Quicksilver War: Syria, Iraq and the Spiral of Conflict. 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, USA: Oxford University Press. hlm. 176. ISBN 9780190874872. 
  56. ^ "Iraq: Pro-Government Militias' Trail of Death". Human Rights Watch. 31 July 2014. Diarsipkan dari versi asli tanggal 22 December 2014. 
  57. ^ Jane Arraf (29 Jan 2015). "Iraq PM orders urgent probe into military 'massacre'". Al Jazeera. Diakses tanggal 16 March 2015. 
  58. ^ Urban, Mark, Task Force Black: The Explosive True Story of the Secret Special Forces War in Iraq , St. Martin's Griffin, 2012 ISBN 1250006961 ISBN 978-1250006967, pp. 163–164.
  59. ^ Iraq conflict: Diyala Sunni mosque attack kills dozens, bbc.com.
  60. ^ "Preachers of Hate: Qais Al-Khazali". Arab News. Diarsipkan dari versi asli tanggal 16 July 2019. 
  61. ^ "Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq". Stanford: CISAC. Diarsipkan dari versi asli tanggal 28 April 2019. 
  62. ^ Malek, Caline (16 January 2019). "From tourism to terrorism: How the revolution changed Iran". Arab News. 
  63. ^ Hamidi, Lara (27 April 2023). "Riyadh and Tehran – Does the promotion of religious tolerance truly respect the rights of citizens at home and aboard?". euromedmonitor.org. Diarsipkan dari versi asli tanggal 3 May 2023. 
  64. ^ "If the "Republic" Preserved, there would be no Protests for a Centaury". abdolhamid.net. Diarsipkan dari versi asli tanggal 3 April 2023. 
  65. ^ Kazemzadeh, Masoud (2020). "5:The sources of the Middle East's crises and American grand strategy". Iran's Foreign Policy: Elite Factionalism, Ideology, the Nuclear Weapons Program, and the United States. 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017: Routledge. hlm. 75–76. ISBN 978-0-367-49545-9. 
  66. ^ Boroujerdi, Mehrzad (21 November 2022). "Sunnis in Iran: Protesting Against Decades of Discrimination and Repression". The Washington Institute. Diarsipkan dari versi asli tanggal 21 November 2022. 
  67. ^ Boroujerdi, Mehrzad (21 November 2022). "Sunnis in Iran: Protesting Against Decades of Discrimination and Repression". The Washington Institute. Diarsipkan dari versi asli tanggal 21 November 2022. 
  68. ^ Hamidi, Lara (27 April 2023). "Riyadh and Tehran – Does the promotion of religious tolerance truly respect the rights of citizens at home and aboard?". euromedmonitor.org. Diarsipkan dari versi asli tanggal 3 May 2023. 
  69. ^ Nasr, Vali (2006). "8: The Rise of Iran". The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future (edisi ke-1st). New York, USA: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc. hlm. 225. ISBN 978-0-393-06211-3. 
  70. ^ Kazemzadeh, Masoud (2020). Iran's Foreign Policy: Elite Factionalism, Ideology, the Nuclear Weapons Program, and the United States. 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017: Routledge. hlm. 52, 62, 67–77. ISBN 978-0-367-49545-9. 
  71. ^ Boroujerdi, Mehrzad (21 November 2022). "Sunnis in Iran: Protesting Against Decades of Discrimination and Repression". The Washington Institute. Diarsipkan dari versi asli tanggal 21 November 2022. 
  72. ^ Hamidi, Lara (27 April 2023). "Riyadh and Tehran – Does the promotion of religious tolerance truly respect the rights of citizens at home and aboard?". euromedmonitor.org. Diarsipkan dari versi asli tanggal 3 May 2023. 
  73. ^ "Iran security forces massacred Sunni Balochi minority, sources confirm". Middle East Monitor. 16 October 2022. Diarsipkan dari versi asli tanggal 17 October 2022. 
  74. ^ "Iran maintains silence on 'massacre' in Sunni-majority city". Al-Monitor. 25 October 2022. Diarsipkan dari versi asli tanggal 26 October 2022. 
  75. ^ Engelbrecht, Tabrizy, Jhaveri, Cora, Nilo, Ishaan (14 October 2022). "'It Was a Massacre': How Security Forces Cracked Down in Southeastern Iran". New York Times. Diarsipkan dari versi asli tanggal 28 October 2022. 
  76. ^ "Iran maintains silence on 'massacre' in Sunni-majority city". Al-Monitor. 25 October 2022. Diarsipkan dari versi asli tanggal 26 October 2022. 
  77. ^ Kiernan, Laura (October 19, 1977). "Amina Khaalis Relives Horror of Slayings, Court Is Told". The Washington Post. Diakses tanggal 10 March 2017. 
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